Studies usually focus on the mechanism of corporate governance and its effect on corporate performance. This study intends to link corporate governance and its effect on financial crisis, we discuss: 1. Will the probability of financial crisis reduced by performing effective corporate governance? 2. Whether corporate governance can be a predicting factor of financial crisis? The sample includes all listed (OTC) companies but excludes financial / securities industry due to their characteristic.
The empirical evidence is collected from 2003 to 2010, showing that: First, low proportion of independent directors and supervisors, large board size, high ratio of directors and supervisors'' pledging shares, high right diverges from duty of pledging directors and supervisors'' shares, low extent of information disclosure, less rigorous of the electing of external auditor, may increase the probability for corporation to fall into financial crisis within three years. Second, the general manager''s shareholding ratio has intervention effect in the relationship between the duality identities of general manager/director to financial crisis. Third, through sensitivity analysis, we found: 1. There is an inverted U-shaped relation between board''s activity and financial crisis. 2. If the duality identities of general manager/director exit, the probability of financial crisis will be reduced through increasing shareholding rate of the general manager. 3. This research identified three common corporate governance variables, such as the low proportion of independent directors and supervisors, high right diverges from duty of pledging directors and supervisors'' shares, and less rigorous of the electing of external auditor can be signals of corporate financial crises.