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    Title: 銀行財富管理之基金費用揭露實施後對理財專銷售之影響
    Other Titles: The impact of disclosing mutual fund fee on the sales willingness of financial advisor in bank wealth management
    Authors: 馬明宜;Ma, Ming-Yi
    Contributors: 淡江大學國際商學碩士在職專班
    黃哲盛
    Keywords: 財富管理;理財專員;基金費用;激勵理論;wealth management;Financial Advisor;Mutual fee;Drive the theory
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2011-12-28 17:54:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 任何的奬勵措施對業務員來說一定有很大的激勵,能刺激業務人員銷售意
    願;成績好的人,總可以享得好的奬勵。但這種制度有時也會誤導業務人員,奬
    勵最好的制度不代表銷售是最好的產品。在銀行的財富管理亦是如此,在過去銀
    行的理財專員在銷售任何的金融商品時, 理財專員為了賺取奬勵金,並不以客
    戶風險及適合程度來篩選商品,反而為了奬金而去銷售給不適合客戶風險屬性的
    金融產品,來賺取奬勵金,進而引發銷售誤導的糾紛。
    在 2010 年6 月,金管會研議,要求2011 年7 月開始,基金公司給國內銷售
    的銀行通路之基金經理費、手續費,必須對投資人揭露。這是政府當局為了抑制
    理專有不當的銷售情況發生,以維護投資人權益。本研究的重點為當此基金申購費
    用分潤制度實施後對理專的銷售意願響,另外也進一步發現消費者對此費用分潤的
    看法。
    本研究透過二場的「焦點群體訪談」方式來探討,從理專的訪談結果發現:(1)
    理專平時與客戶的關係維護做得很好,此費用揭露並不影響理專的銷售意願,也不
    會影響理專與客戶之間的信任度。(2)理專在銷售時看重客戶投資獲利的可能性,但
    是投資報酬是伴隨了總體經濟的風險,還有產品挑選的風險。申購基金的目的為投
    資並以獲利為目標,只要對投資人收取合理費用並告知費用揭露只是銷售過程中的
    一小環節並不抵觸投資的意願。(3)理專認為費用揭露此舉,並不能真正保護消費者。
    另外,也從消費者的訪談中延伸發現:(1)只要理專說明清楚費用揭露內容,消
    費者通常都能接受。(2)消費者在意的是理專建議的投資標的是否能為他們帶來報
    酬。(3)消費者也在意手續費的折扣多寡。
    Any incentive scheme creates the motivation for sales force; it can also influence
    the intention. Good performer will get reward accordingly. However, incentive scheme
    could also misdirect the sales force, best product may not engage with the best
    incentive scheme. In wealth management, when choosing the product for client,
    sometime investment advisor will not base client’s risk tolerance and suitability
    instead of pursue the product with highest incentive. It misled the client and become
    dispute.
    On June, 2010, Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan announced
    Mutual Fund Companies have to disclose the management fee sharing by Banks and
    subscription fee to investors. Government authority tries to prevent any inappropriate
    selling activities, in order to protect the best interest of investors. This thesis focuses the
    impact of the investment advisor’s intention to sell and the investor’s feedback after the
    implementation of fee disclosure.
    Through two group interviews, we have analyzed the result, I found: 1. Investment
    advisor has maintained a good relationship with their clients; it will not affect the
    investment advisor’s intention to sell, nor does the trust between investment advisor and
    client. 2. When investment advisor recommend product to client, the main purpose is to
    make profit, but any investment decision come with systemic and product selection risk.
    The goal for investment is to generate profit, as long as it charges the investors a
    reasonable fee and disclose it. It’s only a small part of selling process, it doesn’t conflict
    with the main purpose of investment.
    On the other hand, from the interview with the investor, I have found: 1. If
    investment advisor disclose the fee structure, the investor usually can accept it. 2. What
    investor really cares about is the recommendation made by investment advisor can
    generate profit. 3. Investor also care about the discount rate for the subscription fee.
    Appears in Collections:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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