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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/74050

    Title: 銀行財富管理之基金費用揭露實施後對理財專銷售之影響
    Other Titles: The impact of disclosing mutual fund fee on the sales willingness of financial advisor in bank wealth management
    Authors: 馬明宜;Ma, Ming-Yi
    Contributors: 淡江大學國際商學碩士在職專班
    Keywords: 財富管理;理財專員;基金費用;激勵理論;wealth management;Financial Advisor;Mutual fee;Drive the theory
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2011-12-28 17:54:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 任何的奬勵措施對業務員來說一定有很大的激勵,能刺激業務人員銷售意
    行的理財專員在銷售任何的金融商品時, 理財專員為了賺取奬勵金,並不以客
    在 2010 年6 月,金管會研議,要求2011 年7 月開始,基金公司給國內銷售
    Any incentive scheme creates the motivation for sales force; it can also influence
    the intention. Good performer will get reward accordingly. However, incentive scheme
    could also misdirect the sales force, best product may not engage with the best
    incentive scheme. In wealth management, when choosing the product for client,
    sometime investment advisor will not base client’s risk tolerance and suitability
    instead of pursue the product with highest incentive. It misled the client and become
    On June, 2010, Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan announced
    Mutual Fund Companies have to disclose the management fee sharing by Banks and
    subscription fee to investors. Government authority tries to prevent any inappropriate
    selling activities, in order to protect the best interest of investors. This thesis focuses the
    impact of the investment advisor’s intention to sell and the investor’s feedback after the
    implementation of fee disclosure.
    Through two group interviews, we have analyzed the result, I found: 1. Investment
    advisor has maintained a good relationship with their clients; it will not affect the
    investment advisor’s intention to sell, nor does the trust between investment advisor and
    client. 2. When investment advisor recommend product to client, the main purpose is to
    make profit, but any investment decision come with systemic and product selection risk.
    The goal for investment is to generate profit, as long as it charges the investors a
    reasonable fee and disclose it. It’s only a small part of selling process, it doesn’t conflict
    with the main purpose of investment.
    On the other hand, from the interview with the investor, I have found: 1. If
    investment advisor disclose the fee structure, the investor usually can accept it. 2. What
    investor really cares about is the recommendation made by investment advisor can
    generate profit. 3. Investor also care about the discount rate for the subscription fee.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of International Business] Thesis

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