本研究採用現有學者提出的三項假說，設定出合適的計量模型。經由固定效果(fixed effect)模型估計結果發現，我國董事會規模與負債比率(Debt)之間呈現顯著的正相關，董事會規模與股東權益市值(Ln MVE)之間呈現非常顯著的正相關，董事會規模與自由現金流量比率(FCF)之間呈現顯著的負相關，董事會規模與Tobin’s Q之間呈現顯著的負相關。最後，我們也發現，不論考慮親屬關係與否的外部董事比例與總經理持股比例之間皆呈現很顯著的負相關；而不考慮親屬關係的外部董事比例與總資產報酬率(ROA)之間呈現很顯著的正相關，但考慮親屬關係的外部董事比例與總資產報酬率(ROA)之間卻呈現不顯著的正向相關。亦即，得到不論考慮親屬關係與否，董事會的獨立性會隨著總經理的影響力縮減，但是會隨著總經理被限制的影響力而增加。 Our paper examines the trends and determinants of board structure for a large sample of Taiwan electronics industry''s firms from 1992 to 2009. Firstly, a comparative analysis of the UK、US and Taiwan legal and institutional settings leads us to hypothesize that Taiwan electronics industry''s board structures will not be determined by monitoring related factors. Our evidence supports this, showing that board structure determinants differ in predictable ways across different institutional settings. And in contrast to recent US and UK mandatory reforms, Taiwan reforms have been voluntary. As such they provide an interesting comparison, being arguably more effective than a mandatory approach by allowing firms to choose board structures most appropriate for their own needs. Our results support this point of view. Our evidence supports this. Although we find, consistent with recent studies, that board size and outsider proportion are positively impacted by greater advising needs and negatively impacted by CEO influence, outsider proportion is not related to monitoring costs.