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    Title: 董監事質押比率與公司經營績效之非線性影響 : 金融業與一般產業之比較
    Other Titles: The nonlinear effect of equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors on the firm performance : financial industry and non-financial industry
    Authors: 陳伊婷;Chen, Yi-Ting
    Contributors: 淡江大學財務金融學系碩士班
    聶建中
    Keywords: 經營績效;董監事質押比率;平滑移轉模型;代理理論;Performance;Equity pledge ratio;agency problem;Panel Smooth Transition Regression
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2011-12-28 17:36:52 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究主要探討董監事質押比率與公司經營績效之關聯性,以2000年至2009年間台灣上市公司資料進行實證觀察,以瞭解公司的經營績效是否受會董監股權質押比率的影響。研究結果發現,在一般產業中,董監事持股比率對公司經營績效之影響在非集團公司的實證結果支持利益收斂假說;在集團公司部分則支持臨界說,兩者為非線性關係,隨著董監事質押比率上升,董監事持股比率對公司經營績效之影響先為正相關後為負相關。顯示核心代理問題在集團公司比非集團公司嚴重。而在金融產業中,績效代理變數的不同亦會影響實證結果,在ROA部分,董監事持股比率會隨著董監事質押比率上升,從正相關轉變為負相關,支持臨界說,實證結果與一般產業相同;但在ROE部分,董監事持股比率對經營績效的影響,則維持負相關,支持利益掠奪假說,可知在較低的董監事質押比率時,金融業就可能引發核心代理問題,在一般產業則需要高過一定水準後才可能引發核心代理問題。
    公司董監事的股權質押原為個人的行為,在公司治理制度的設計下,應與公司經營績效無顯著相關。但實證結果顯示董監事質押比率與公司經營績效有顯著關性,兩者之關係會隨著董監事質押比率和行業別的不同,其對公司經營績效的影響程度亦不同。本研究貢獻在於藉由實證結果,具體提出董監事質押比率對公司價值具有明確影響,並提出明確數據來辨明最終控制者持股比率之正誘因效果和負侵占效果,使投資者慎選投資標的,避免成為控制股東掠奪外部股東的犧牲者,也提供政府機關在訂定董監事質押比率限制之參考。
    The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear effect of equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors on the firm performance by using Panel Smooth Threshold Regression model. Collateralizing shares by board of directors will reinforce the agency problem between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. Directors’ pledge ratio is regarded as the threshold variable by using the listed companies’ data from 2000 to 2009 in Taiwan to explore the relation. We separate financial firms from entire sample to explore the effect of equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors on the firm performance because they are special cases. This study divides the non-financial sample into a subsample of conglomerate firms and a subsample of non-conglomerate firms. Further, this study describes and compares the different results.
    The empirical results show that there exist nonlinear effects between the directors’ shareholding and the firm performance in the conglomerate firms when equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is the threshold variable. There is a significant positive relation between the directors’ shareholding and the firm performance in the non-conglomerate firms. The findings imply that the agency problem due to collateralize by board of directors is more serious in the conglomerate firms than in the non-conglomerate firms. Furthermore, when equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is more than the threshold value, the higher the directors'' shareholdings, the lower the firm performance in financial industry will be. The agency problem might occur in financial industry more easily when the equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is very low.
    Appears in Collections:[財務金融學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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