|摘要: ||1944年二戰結束前的夏天，為處理戰後經濟與財務危機，44個同盟國代表團在美國新罕布夏州，布列敦森林召開聯合國貨幣金融會議。羅斯福政府領導盟國共同成立國際貨幣基金組織 (IMF) 以及國際復興開發銀行 (IBRD)，爾後稱之為布列敦森林體系。由於世界黃金產量不足以支撐國際金融體系中不斷增長的貨幣流量，兩個國際金融組織提供了黃金與美元之間的固定匯率。美國政府並保證以每1美元換取35盎司黃金，促使美元成為戰後的國際儲備貨幣。|
In the summer of 1944, while World War II was still raging through Europe, forty-four Allied nations assembled at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States, to reconstruct a postwar international economic and financial system. The Roosevelt administration played a critical role in leading the conference to establish an International Monetary Fund (IMF) and an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The institutions of the Bretton Woods System provided a fixed relationship between U.S. dollar and gold. Since the gold production was insufficient to meet the demands of growing liquidity of international money flow, the dollar was the only existing currency strong enough to face the challenge. With the U.S. government converting one dollar into gold at $35 an ounce, the U.S. dollar became the postwar reserve currency.
By applying Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Governmental Politics Model (GPM), this thesis aims at exploring the decision-making processes of the Roosevelt administration in the formation of the Bretton Woods System during the period from 1941 to 1944.
From the perspective of RAM, the United States rejected the International Clearing Union proposed by Lord John Maynard Keynes of Great Britain and other plans proposed by their allies, and thereby urged the establishment of the International Stabilization Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to promote economic and financial stability and free trade around the world. From the perspective of OBM, warfare broke out between the Department of Treasury and Department of State because both agencies tried to gain more influence over each other. Eventually the Department of Treasury won the battle because it had more financial experts and more exercise in the field, whereas the Department of State did not have much of experience in making monetary and financial policies. From the perspective of GPM, FDR agreed with Henry Morgenthau Jr., the Secretary of Treasury, more than Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, because the Secretary Morgenthau had a highly specialized economist Harry Dexter White who drafted the blueprint for the two postwar international agencies. In addition, Morgenthau was a close family friend to FDR; hence he held an informal access channel to the President. As a result, Secretary Hull was literally incompatible with Secretary Morgenthau.
In sum, the application of the three decision-making models serves to explain the underlying theme of the thesis; the United States gained economic dominance in the postwar era by leading the establishment of the Bretton Woods system; the Department of Treasury gained the upper hand over Department of State due to its organizational culture and capability; and the Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau Jr., was more involved than the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, because he had a better access channel to the President.