公司治理能否抑制盈餘管理對IPO 長期報酬之負向影響？

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Title:	公司治理能否抑制盈餘管理對IPO 長期報酬之負向影響？
Authors:	湯惠雯
Contributors:	淡江大學會計學系
Keywords:	公司治理;盈餘管理;新上市公司;長期報酬;corporate governance;earnings management;initial public offerings;long-run returns
Date:	2009-05
Issue Date:	2011-10-23 11:58:00 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	臺北縣淡水鎮 : 淡江大學會計學系
Abstract:	本研究昌在探討公司治理機制能否抑制新上市公司在上市前的盈餘操縱，進而減緩長期績效反轉的現象。研究結果顯示，上市前盈餘管理最積極的投資組合長期報酬最差且均為負數，而盈餘管理最保守者之長期報酬最佳且均為正向。本研究亦發現，雖然上市前的盈餘管理不利於發行公司的後續續效，存在次大股東或選擇高聲譽會計師事務所均能有效抑制新上市公司因盈餘操縱所造成的股價下跌;然而，增加外部董事席次的比率，非但無法抑制上市前的盈餘操縱，反而加劇長期股價的跌幅。 This study aims to explore whether corporate governance can mitigate the abuse of earnings management prior initial public offerings CIPOs) and, therefore, lessen post-issuing underperformance arising from earnings manipulation. This paper provides the evidence that the IPO issuers in the most aggressive quartile of earnings management have the worst and negative long-run returns, while IPO issuers in the most conservative quartile of earnings management have the best and positive ones. This study also shows that although earnings management before IPOs may hurt postissuing stock returns, monitoring from the second largest shareholders or choosing an auditor with high reputation could alleviate the reversal of stock price due to pre-IPO earnings management. Conversely, recruiting more outside directors does not restrain earnings manipulation prior IPO but leads to worse subsequent returns.
Relation:	2009年第十三屆會計與管理學術研討會論文集(上冊)，頁193-216
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Proceeding

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