Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 風險管理與保險學系 > 會議論文 > Item 987654321/68360

請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/68360

題名:	Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance
作者:	黃瑞卿;Huang, Rachel J.;曾郁仁;Tzeng, Larry Y.;汪琪玲;Wang, Kili C.
貢獻者:	淡江大學保險學系
關鍵詞:	asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.
日期:	2008-12
上傳時間:	2011-10-23 11:56:55 (UTC+8)
摘要:	This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and maintenance data from the largest car manufacturer in Taiwan, we demonstrate advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance in Taiwan.
關聯:	台灣風險與保險學會第二屆年會暨國際學術研討會
顯示於類別:	[風險管理與保險學系] 會議論文

文件中的檔案:

沒有與此文件相關的檔案.

在機構典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.

TAIR相關文章