Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance

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题名:	Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance
作者:	黃瑞卿;汪琪玲;曾郁仁
贡献者:	淡江大學保險學系
关键词:	asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.
日期:	2008-11
上传时间:	2011-10-23 11:56:43 (UTC+8)
摘要:	This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and maintenance data from the largest car manufacturer in Taiwan, we demonstrate advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance in Taiwan.
關聯:	2008年臺灣經濟計量學會年會
显示于类别:	[風險管理與保險學系] 會議論文

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