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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/68359


    Title: Testing Advantageous Selection by Hidden Action: Evidence from Automobile Liability Insurance
    Authors: 黃瑞卿;汪琪玲;曾郁仁
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系
    Keywords: asymmetric information, advantageous selection, hidden action,automobile liability insurance.
    Date: 2008-11
    Issue Date: 2011-10-23 11:56:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper examines advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance from
    the approach with hidden action, which argues that the individual’s private
    information on his own characteristics will affect his decision on the investment on
    precautionary effort (hidden action) to reduce the loss probability and further results
    in a negative relationship between coverage and loss probability in equilibrium. We
    argue that individual’s vehicle maintenance record could be a proper proxy for the
    precautionary effort. By combining insurance data from an insurance company and
    maintenance data from the largest car manufacturer in Taiwan, we demonstrate
    advantageous selection in automobile liability insurance in Taiwan.
    Relation: 2008年臺灣經濟計量學會年會
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Proceeding

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