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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/68356


    Title: Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market
    Authors: 汪琪玲;曾郁仁;王儷玲;王仁宏
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系
    Keywords: asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.
    Date: 2007-05
    Issue Date: 2011-10-23 11:56:06 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 政治大學風險管理與保險學系
    Abstract: This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.
    Relation: 第七屆風險管理理論研討會論文集
    Appears in Collections:[保險學系暨研究所] 會議論文

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