Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 風險管理與保險學系 > 會議論文 > Item 987654321/68354

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题名:	Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market
作者:	汪琪玲;曾郁仁;王儷玲;王仁宏
贡献者:	淡江大學保險學系
关键词:	asymmetric information, automobile insurance, dealer-owned agents, marketing channel.
日期:	2007-07
上传时间:	2011-10-23 11:55:40 (UTC+8)
摘要:	This paper examines the existence of provider-induced asymmetric information in the insurance market. The empirical data on comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan provide a unique opportunity to test our hypothesis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence that providers do induce asymmetric information problems. Our empirical results show that the conditional correlation between the coverage level and the occurrence of a claim is higher for insurance policies sold through dealer-owned agents than for those sold through other marketing channels.
關聯:	Asia-Pacific Risk and Insurance Association(APRIA) 11th Annual Conference
显示于类别:	[風險管理與保險學系] 會議論文

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