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    题名: Evidence for Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market
    作者: Huang, Rachel J.;Tzeng, Larry Y.;Wang, Kili C.
    贡献者: 淡江大學保險學系
    关键词: insurance market, asymmetric information, adverse selection.
    日期: 2006-09
    上传时间: 2011-10-23 11:54:50 (UTC+8)
    出版者: International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics
    摘要: This paper proposes a new method to directly test the existence of adverse
    selection in the automobile insurance market. By tracing the renewal decisions of the
    insured, we find that, in Taiwan automobile insurance market, the choice of insurance
    coverage and the previous-year claim records are positive ly correlated, which can be a
    result of adverse selection but not of moral hazard. We further find that the loss ratio is
    positively correlated to the choice of insurance coverage. This indicates that
    cross-subsidization may exist in the market. The finding of cross-subsidization further
    strengthens the evidence to support the existence of adverse selection.
    關聯: Proceedings of the 33rd Seminar of the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists
    显示于类别:[風險管理與保險學系] 會議論文


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