Does opportunistic fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate with the business cycle?

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 風險管理與保險學系 > 會議論文 > Item 987654321/68347

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題名:	Does opportunistic fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate with the business cycle?
作者:	Wang, Kili C.
貢獻者:	淡江大學保險學系
關鍵詞:	Theory;Fraud;Automobile;Economic development;Moral hazard
日期:	2010-07-25
上傳時間:	2011-10-23 11:54:12 (UTC+8)
摘要:	Insurance fraud is a serious problem throughout the world. In response to this, Dionne and Gagné (2002) have pioneered an approach that provides evidence of opportunistic fraud that can be distinguished from adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper follows their methodology and provides further evidence of opportunistic fraud existing in the cases of both contracts with replacement cost endorsement and "no deductible" contracts. Under a replacement cost endorsement contract, the incentive to engage in opportunistic fraud becomes stronger near the end of the policy year, whereas under the no deductible contract it is stronger at the beginning of the policy year. This paper also contributes to the literature in that it is the first paper to investigate the relationship between opportunistic fraud and the macroeconomy. We find that the severity of opportunistic fraud fluctuates in the opposite direction to the business cycle. The opportunistic fraud is stimulated in times of recession, and it is mitigated during a boom.
顯示於類別:	[風險管理與保險學系] 會議論文

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檔案	大小	格式	瀏覽次數
2_ga_ed_369_paper_session_3c_1_wang_theory,automobile,fraud.pdf	1464Kb	Adobe PDF	216	檢視/開啟

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