Optimal Bank Interest Margin and Shareholder Interest Conflicts under CEO Overconfidence: A Constrained Option-Pricing Model

淡江大學機構典藏 > 商管學院 > 國際企業學系暨研究所 > 期刊論文 > Item 987654321/67462

jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/67462

题名:	Optimal Bank Interest Margin and Shareholder Interest Conflicts under CEO Overconfidence: A Constrained Option-Pricing Model
作者:	Lin, Jyh-Horng;Lii, Peirchyi;Jou, Rosemary
贡献者:	淡江大學國際貿易學系
关键词:	CEO Overconfidence;Bank Margin;Call Pricing
日期:	2009-12
上传时间:	2011-10-22 23:55:41 (UTC+8)
摘要:	Less is known about how equity returns allocated between current and new shareholders are altered to react to chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence. This paper uses a nonlinear constrained contingent claim methodology of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) to explore interest conflicts between current and new shareholders when an overconfident bank CEO overestimates returns on investment projects, and sequentially raises too much in external funds when internal resources become scarce. We show that low levels of bank interest margins or equity returns, which decrease the claims of current shareholders, are associated with investment distortions; but high levels of bank equity returns, which dilute the claims of current shareholders, are associated with external financing distortion.
關聯:	WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications 6(12), pp.1861-1871
显示于类别:	[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

文件中的档案:

档案	大小	格式	浏览次数
index.html	0Kb	HTML	266	检视/开启
index.html	0Kb	HTML	243	检视/开启
Optimal Bank Interest Margin and Shareholder Interest Conflicts under CEO Overconfidence A Constrained Option-Pricing Model.pdf	346Kb	Adobe PDF	2	检视/开启

在機構典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

TAIR相关文章