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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/67462


    Title: Optimal Bank Interest Margin and Shareholder Interest Conflicts under CEO Overconfidence: A Constrained Option-Pricing Model
    Authors: Lin, Jyh-Horng;Lii, Peirchyi;Jou, Rosemary
    Contributors: 淡江大學國際貿易學系
    Keywords: CEO Overconfidence;Bank Margin;Call Pricing
    Date: 2009-12
    Issue Date: 2011-10-22 23:55:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Less is known about how equity returns allocated between current and new shareholders are altered to react to chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence. This paper uses a nonlinear constrained contingent claim methodology of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) to explore interest conflicts between current and new shareholders when an overconfident bank CEO overestimates returns on investment projects, and sequentially raises too much in external funds when internal resources become scarce. We show that low levels of bank interest margins or equity returns, which decrease the claims of current shareholders, are associated with investment distortions; but high levels of bank equity returns, which dilute the claims of current shareholders, are associated with external financing distortion.
    Relation: WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications 6(12), pp.1861-1871
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of International Business] Journal Article

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