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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/67437

    Title: Full Collusion vs. Partial Collusion ina Spatial Model
    Authors: Pao, S.H.;Chang, S.H.
    Contributors: 淡江大學國際貿易學系暨國際企業研究所
    Keywords: Location;full collusion;partial collusion;Löschian competition
    Date: 2008-03
    Issue Date: 2011-10-22 23:53:14 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: In this paper, we show that the price and profit under full collusion, in which firms collude with respect to both price and location, are higher than those under partial collusion, in which firms collude with respect to price only. And we also show that Löschian competition is equal to full collusion. In other words, the price, profit and even social surplus under Löschian competition are higher, not lower, just like Hwang et al (1993) stressed, than those under (partial) collusion. The cause that makes our findings different from those in Hwang et al (1993) is the location choice, exogenous-sly given or endogenously determined.
    Relation: Journal of Statistics & Management Systems 11(2), pp.375-386
    DOI: 10.1080/09720510.2008.10701318
    Appears in Collections:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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