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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/67419

    题名: Bank Interest Margins under Information Asymmetry and Centralized vs. Decentralized Loan Rate Decisions:A Two-Stage Option Pricing Model
    作者: Lin, Jyh-horng;Lin, Jyh-Jiuan;Jou, Rosemary
    贡献者: 淡江大學國際貿易學系暨國際企業研究所
    关键词: Centralized vs. decentralized loan rate;Information asymmetry;Black-Scholes formula.
    日期: 2009-12
    上传时间: 2011-10-22 23:51:01 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Athens: World Scientific and Engineering Academy and Society (W S E A S)
    摘要: The behavior of outside portfolio managers of large money-center banks as analyzed to date is silent. In a centralized loan portfolio construction with decentralized loan portfolio management, changes in the bank’s degree of capital market imperfection have direct effects on the bank’s interest margin through the centralized as well as the decentralized loan rate determinations. We use a two-stage model of option-based analysis to study how information asymmetry and optimal bank loan rates relate to one another. We find that the decentralized loan rate managed by the outside loan manager is positively related to the bank’s degree of capital market imperfection. The centralized loan rate managed by the bank is positively related to its degree of capital market imperfection under strategic complements, but negatively under strategic substitutes.
    關聯: WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications 11(6), pp.1814-1829
    显示于类别:[國際企業學系暨研究所] 期刊論文


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