本文建立一個垂直相關市場的理論模型，於存在可自由進出的中間財市場下，分別討論最終財廠商創新為非劇烈與劇烈下的授權問題。當廠商創新為非劇烈時，不同的授權方式並不會影響中間財的價格。值得注意的是，當存在可自由進出的中間財市場時，在劇烈創新下，不管最終財創新廠商以因定權利金或單位權利金授權，授權均會降低中間財價格進而提高授權廠商的利潤。此一結論打破了過去授權文獻認為劇烈創新下，創新廠商一定不會授權的結論。 This paper establishes a vertical-related model to discuss the licensing issue under two situations: the innovation of the final good firm is non-drastic or drastic. Under the model which considers both the intermediate goods and the final goods, we find that the choice of royalty versus fixed fees licensing will not affect the intermediate goods' price if the final good's firm is non-drastic innovation firm. However, when the final good's firm is a drastic innovation firm, the equilibrium intermediate goods’ price under licensing would be higher than that under non-licensing. We also note that, when the final good's firm processes a drastic innovation, licensing could still occur under the vertical-related model. The above result is different from the past licensing literatures' conclusion: when the final good's firm has drastic innovation, licensing never occurs.
