研究結果發現台灣高速鐵路建設計畫「三方契約」政府提供融資擔保及發生興建營運合約終止情事時行使介入權之機制，未能完全符合專業融資之理論基礎。建議政府為每一項BOT 素量身打造，依據不同規模予以評估，制定特別法，並應有階段性的思考與管控邏輯設計，建設初期以財務與工程進度為主，工程到一個段落後，計畫主力應逐漸轉移至營運及開發計畫。 In the past recent years due to deteriorating fiscal situation the government has allowed private sector to participate in several large transportation construction projects. One common concern of private participation in public infrastructure construction has been that as the construction project moved on, the problem of financial insolvency also loomed, casting doubt on the continuation and completion of the project.
The root cause lies in the poor financial planning (typically gross under-estimation of the fund needed to complete the project),
necessitating several rounds of request for funding addition. Thus, to avoid the same mistakes, it is imperative to introduce and promote responsible and accurate project financing into public infrastructure developments. The result shows that the mechanisms, provided by the Tri-party Contract for The Construction of Taiwan High Speed Rail Project, that government may acts as a financing guarantor and the intervention right at the time of termination in the Construction and Operation Contract do not completely fit in with the theoretical basis of the project financing. As we understand that each built-operate-transfer (BOT) project is unique with various scale and characteristics. Therefore, it is suggested that government should develop a suitable BOT mechanism, including developing comprehensive BOT laws, to fulfill special need of various BOT projects.The suitable BOT mechanism must include proper and clear design of step-by-step consideration and project control logic. For example, it should focus on the progress control of project financing and engineering in the beginning stage, but concentrate on project operating issues and real estate developments in the late stage of a BOT project.