Fuzzy Set Theory in Managerial Contract Analyses

機構典藏 > College of Business and Management > Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting > Journal Article > Item 987654321/64138

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/64138

Title:	Fuzzy Set Theory in Managerial Contract Analyses
Authors:	林芳綺;Lin, H. C.;Hsiao, T. Y.;Lin, Y. C.
Contributors:	淡江大學會計學系
Keywords:	Compensation;Managerial contract;Fuzzy set theory
Date:	2009-04
Issue Date:	2011-10-20 12:45:22 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper provides a fuzzy solution to managerial contract analyses. The literature shows that due to the existence of information asymmetry, principals could not completely observe real actions of agents. They are actually making contractual decisions subjectively under vague conditions. In this paper, we adopt fuzzy theory to managerial contract analyses and find that it is more efficient than using binary probability methodologies. We also prove that considering the fuzzy factors into the managerial contract analyses scales down agency and production costs and therefore gives a better utility result to a firm.
Relation:	Expert System With Applications 36, pp.4535-4540
DOI:	10.1016/j.eswa.2008.05.012
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Journal Article

Files in This Item:

File	Size	Format
index.html	0Kb	HTML	93	View/Open