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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/64138

    題名: Fuzzy Set Theory in Managerial Contract Analyses
    作者: 林芳綺;Lin, H. C.;Hsiao, T. Y.;Lin, Y. C.
    貢獻者: 淡江大學會計學系
    關鍵詞: Compensation;Managerial contract;Fuzzy set theory
    日期: 2009-04
    上傳時間: 2011-10-20 12:45:22 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper provides a fuzzy solution to managerial contract analyses. The literature shows that due to the existence of information asymmetry, principals could not completely observe real actions of agents. They are actually making contractual decisions subjectively under vague conditions. In this paper, we adopt fuzzy theory to managerial contract analyses and find that it is more efficient than using binary probability methodologies. We also prove that considering the fuzzy factors into the managerial contract analyses scales down agency and production costs and therefore gives a better utility result to a firm.
    關聯: Expert System With Applications 36, pp.4535-4540
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eswa.2008.05.012
    顯示於類別:[會計學系暨研究所] 期刊論文


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