|Abstract: ||生命倫理學(Bioethics)雖是以生命科學所引發之倫理問題為核心，但是在倫理學基礎上與傳統倫理學仍是息息相關。本文以恩格爾哈特的《生命倫理學的基礎》一書為參考點，說明儒學如何因應後現代倫理學所呈現的相對主義與虛無主義，以及儒學如何提供一種一般的、俗世的倫理學，用以溝通不同道德背景的人，也就是使道德異鄉人(moral stranger)之間之溝通成為可能。本文認為恩氏對一般的、俗世的倫理學之要求與普遍倫理之建構有異曲同工之妙，至於儒學甚至所有文明之倫理學，其實都有雙重面向，儒學一方面以禮樂教化提供一套具內容的、具體的倫理學，一方面也以仁心良知提供一套一般的、俗世的倫理學，也就是普遍的、不具內容的、一般的倫理學。這二種倫理學並非排斥關係，而是必然互動的一體。其次，本文也說明「己所不欲，勿施於人」此種以己心推他心之內推法是否能有效建構一套兼具以上二種面向的倫理學。本文最後是以合理的信念做為基礎，說明儒學的仁心良知乃是實踐之知的產物，雖然在邏輯上無法有效推論其普遍性，但是卻是合理的信念，因為我們有實踐及理性為基礎，並且以此基礎通過對話與自我坎陷，應可形成一種開放的歷程與信念，做為安身立命之道。最後，本文強調由仁心良知到禮樂教化內容之間，應有中層的道德原則使一般的、俗世的道德與具體的、共內容的道德之間，建立理論及操作上之邏輯關係，使道德原理的可操作性提高。同時，具體的倫理必然是相應具體的生活而成立，因此，經驗內容的豐富性也就十分重要，在此，我們特別強調朱子的格物致知及荀子「法後王」的觀念，以豐富道德原則的具體性。總之，儒學並非已完成之存在，而是一正在開展中的歷程，儒學充分意識到自己不必然是唯一的倫理學，但是卻是一個有價值的倫理學，也就是分殊中的一個，但是分殊中也有理一的成分，此即儒學所嚮往的常道所在。|
Although revolving around the ethical issues raised by life science, bioethics is intimated related to traditional ethics regarding the foundation of ethics. In this article, we take Engelhard's The Foundations of Bioethics as the reference point, stating how Confucianism responds to the relativism and nihilism presented in post-modem ethics and how Confucianism provides an ordinary and secular ethics whereby to communicate with people of different moral backgrounds, that is, to make the communication between moral strangers possible. Here it is assumed that Engelhard's demand of ordinary and secular ethics and his construction of general ethics are different in approaches but similar in results. As for Confucianism and even ethics of all civilizations, they all have double faces. On the one hand, Confucianism offers a set of substantial and concrete ethics through the education of rites; on the other hand, it provides a set of ordinary and secular (namely, general, insubstantial and ordinary) ethics through benevolence and conscience. These two kinds of ethics are inevitably interactive rather than mutually exclusive. Then, we also explain here whether this inward approach-"don't do unto others what you don't want others do unto you"-can efficiently construct a set of ethics that possesses the two aforementioned faces. Based eventually on reasonable beliefs, this paper explains that the Confucian concepts of benevolence and conscience are the products of practical knowledge. Though we can't infer effectively in logic their generality, these beliefs are reasonable because they are based on practice and reason, which provide the grounds, through dialogues and self-negation, for a kind of open progresses and beliefs as the way to settle oneself down. Finally, it is stressed that from benevolence and conscience to the substance of the education of rites and music, there should be intermediate principles of morality which construct the logical relationship in theory and operation between the ordinary and secular morality and the concrete and substantial morality, improving on the operability of the principles of morality. In the meantime, concrete ethics is inevitably founded in correspondence with concrete life; therefore, the richness of experience is very important. Here we emphasize specifically the concepts of Zhu Xi's "studying the phenomena of nature in order to acquire knowledge" and Xun Zi's "modeling after latter kings" to enrich the concreteness of the principles of morality. All in all, Confucianism is an on-going progress rather than finished and completed entity. Confucianism is fully aware that it is not necessarily the one and only ethics, but one valuable ethics, that is, one of the many manifestations. And yet, any manifestations contain part of the one principle; and this is the common way that Confucianism aspires for.