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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/61463


    Title: 承銷商聲譽之訊號傳遞效果-完美貝氏均衡分析
    Other Titles: The Signaling Effect of Underwriter Reputation:The Application of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
    Authors: 湯惠雯
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系
    Keywords: 承銷商聲譽;新上市公司;訊號賽局;完美貝氏均衡;Underwriter Reputation;Initial Public Offerings;Signaling Game;Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
    Date: 2008-03-01
    Issue Date: 2011-10-15 14:11:26 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 高雄市:正修科技大學國際交流組
    Abstract: 由於投資人對於新上市公司的真實價值普遍存在資訊不對稱現象,因此發行公司會選擇不同的品質訊號傳遞機制,以降低資訊不對稱的影響。本研究利用完美貝氏均衡的概念分析訊號賽局,探討承銷商聲譽是否可作爲新上市公司真實價值的訊號傳遞機制。本研究模型證明,若選擇高聲譽承銷商的訊號成本夠高,足以使低真實價值的公司無法模仿,但又不致於使高真實價值公司不願選擇時,則承銷商聲譽即可作爲品質訊號的傳遞;倘若訊號傳遞成本太低,則不論何種類型的公司均會採取相同策略而形成混合均衡,使得此訊號不具傳遞新上市公司真實價值之效果。
    Relation: 管理科學與統計決策=Journal of Management Science & Statistical Decision 5(1),頁16-25
    DOI: 10.6704/JMSSD.2008.5.1.16
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Journal Article

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