The Asymmetric Information Problem in Taiwan's Cancer Insurance Market

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/61254

Title:	The Asymmetric Information Problem in Taiwan's Cancer Insurance Market
Other Titles:	對台灣商業癌症保險訊息不對稱之研究
Authors:	Kili C. Wand;Jin-Lung Peng;Yi-Yun Sun;Yao-Chia Chang
Contributors:	淡江大學保險學系
Keywords:	asymmetric information;adverse selection;cancer insurance
Date:	2011-12-01
Issue Date:	2011-10-15 13:27:03 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
Abstract:	This paper investigates the problem of asymmetric information in Taiwan’s cancer insurance market. Through the survey data, we find evidence of adverse selection existing in this market. Furthermore, we collect additional information on the individual, and find that the individual’s family cancer history contains additional valuable information. It can not only more accurately predict the probability of contracting cancer, as well as predict the willingness to purchase extended cancer insurance, but it can also help to mitigate the severity of adverse selection in the insurance market.
Relation:	The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 36(2), p.202-219
DOI:	10.1057/grir.2010.12
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Journal Article

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