PECKING ORDER THEORY REVISITED: THE ROLE OF AGENCY COST

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Title:	PECKING ORDER THEORY REVISITED: THE ROLE OF AGENCY COST
Authors:	Wang, Kuang-cheng A.;Lin, Chun-hung A.
Contributors:	淡江大學產業經濟學系
Date:	2010-09
Issue Date:	2011-10-15 11:28:35 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Abstract:	Considering conflicts between shareholders and managers, we revisit the external pecking order of corporate financing under conditions of information asymmetry. With the possibility that debt financing may lead a firm to bankruptcy, we find first that the external pecking order could be reversed. Second, pooling equilibria also exist in our model in two forms: debt issuance and equity issuance. Our results modify pecking-order theory and explain some empirical findings of Jung et al. (Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42 (1996), pp. 159–185).
Relation:	The Manchester School 78(5), pp.395-411
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02201.x
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

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