English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 58203/91779 (63%)
造访人次 : 13774716      在线人数 : 58
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧:
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号",以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻,建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段,可获得较完整数据
  • 进阶搜寻


    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/61086


    题名: PECKING ORDER THEORY REVISITED: THE ROLE OF AGENCY COST
    作者: Wang, Kuang-cheng A.;Lin, Chun-hung A.
    贡献者: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    日期: 2010-09
    上传时间: 2011-10-15 11:28:35 (UTC+8)
    出版者: Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    摘要: Considering conflicts between shareholders and managers, we revisit the external pecking order of corporate financing under conditions of information asymmetry. With the possibility that debt financing may lead a firm to bankruptcy, we find first that the external pecking order could be reversed. Second, pooling equilibria also exist in our model in two forms: debt issuance and equity issuance. Our results modify pecking-order theory and explain some empirical findings of Jung et al. (Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 42 (1996), pp. 159–185).
    關聯: The Manchester School 78(5), pp.395-411
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02201.x
    显示于类别:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 描述 大小格式浏览次数
    1467-9957_78(5)p395-411.pdf135KbAdobe PDF249检视/开启
    PECKING ORDER THEORY REVISITED THE ROLE OF AGENCY COST.pdf135KbAdobe PDF0检视/开启

    在機構典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

    TAIR相关文章

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - 回馈