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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/58081


    Title: Equilibrium Production-Location Decisions under Duopoly
    Authors: 麥朝成;Mai, Chao-cheng;Hwang, Hong;Shieh, Yeung-nan
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    Keywords: Plant location;Duopoly;Strategic effect
    Date: 1998-01
    Issue Date: 2011-09-29 10:55:36 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Elsevier
    Abstract: This paper examines the equilibrium production-location decisions of a Cournot–Nash duopoly game. It shows that once the strategic effects stemming from duopolistic interactions are taken into account, the equilibrium of the one-stage game may deviate from that of the two-stage game, depending on not only the characteristics of each firm's production function but also whether products are strategic substitutes or complements. It also shows that the impact of a symmetric change in market demand on location decisions of duopolistic firms may be different under the one-stage game and the two-stage game.
    Relation: Regional Science and Urban Economics 28(1), pp.123-133
    DOI: 10.1016/S0166-0462(97)00009-4
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

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