Strategic Management under Duopoly

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题名:	Strategic Management under Duopoly
作者:	麥朝成;Mai, Chao-cheng;Hwang, Hong
贡献者:	淡江大學產業經濟學系
日期:	1995-06
上传时间:	2011-09-29 10:53:47 (UTC+8)
出版者:	John Wiley & Sons
摘要:	The purpose of this paper is to present a general conjectural variation model to provide an integrative treatment of strategic management under duopoly. It is shown that the nature of the desired distortion of managers' incentives depends critically on the magnitudes of the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives are zero, the owners will motivate their managers to maximize profits and provide no incentives for sales under consistent conjectures. However, the owners make their managers behave more (less) aggressively and produce more (less) than profit‐maximizers if the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs are larger (smaller) than the actual response.
關聯:	Managerial and Decision Economics 16(3), pp.239-247
DOI:	10.1002/mde.4090160306
显示于类别:	[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 期刊論文

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