淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/58053
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 62822/95882 (66%)
Visitors : 4015077      Online Users : 640
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library & TKU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/58053


    Title: Price Uncertainty and Production-Location Decisions under Free Entry Oligopoly
    Authors: 麥朝成;Mai, Chao-cheng;Yeh, Chiou-nan;Suwanakul, Sontachai
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系
    Date: 1993-11
    Issue Date: 2011-09-29 10:53:24 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: Wiley Periodicals
    Abstract: This paper departs from earlier work on location theory under uncertainty by considering an oligopoly case where the symmetric Cournot‐Nash equilibrium of imperfectly competitive and identical firms are examined. It will be shown that once a Cournot competitive equilibrium is introduced, the demand function plays a central role in the choice of location, and the effects of changes in fixed costs, mean product price and price variability on the firm's optimum location and output are independent of absolute and/or relative risk aversion. These striking results are in sharp contrast with the well‐known results obtained in previous contributions to the location literature.
    Relation: Journal of Regional Science 33(4), pp.531-545
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9787.1993.tb00847.x
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Industrial Economics] Journal Article

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML526View/Open

    All items in 機構典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library & TKU Library IR teams. Copyright ©   - Feedback