CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective

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Title:	CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective
Authors:	Tsai, Wen-hsien;Hung, Jung-hHua;Kuo,Yi-chen;Kuo, Lo-pin
Contributors:	淡江大學會計學系
Keywords:	Non-family firms;Firm ownership;Boards of directors;Firm performance;Family firms;Chief executive officers;CEOs;Firm governance
Date:	2006-03-01
Issue Date:	2011-08-09 13:38:32 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc.
Abstract:	This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled, 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.
Relation:	Family Business Review 19(1), pp.11-28
DOI:	10.1111/j.1741-6248.2006.00057.x
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Accounting] Journal Article

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