|摘要: ||由專業審計人員所審定的企業財務報告，實質上具有提升資訊品質與驗證資訊價值 之功能，因而外部審計被公認為具有傳遞企業私有資訊之功能，而審計簽證所存在的傳 訊價值，乃與審計品質直接相關（Willenborg 1999）。換言之，當審計品質愈佳，財務 報表使用者所面臨的資訊風險愈小，交易風險貼水因而下降，此即形成外部審計之資訊 價值。本研究深入探究在我國證券交易市場中長久以來亟欲得知的議題－審計的資訊傳 遞功能是否真有助於降低受查客戶資訊不對稱之程度？來檢視審計的資訊價值是否存 在? 過去文獻並未直接佐證審計的資訊價值，多採以文獻間的連結形成推論，指出審計 品質能提高財務報告之盈餘品質，因此必然能降低資訊不對稱程度，而使得企業資金成 本下降。相對於過去文獻，本文採用優勢資訊交易機率（probability of information-based trading，簡稱PIN）擷取企業私有資訊交易的頻率，據此直接衡量企業資訊不對稱的程 度；並以會計師事務所規模、會計師任期、裁決性應計數與審計市場產業專家作為審計 品質的代理變數，檢視較高的審計品質，是否對應於受查客戶具有較低的資訊不對稱程 度，確認外部審計確有資訊傳遞的功能與價值。本文除可望對審計的教學有所裨益外， 並可作為研究者未來進一步跨入資訊經濟與審計市場領域結合的基礎。|
The financial statement report of corporate reviewed through professional auditors, is with the function of upgrading information quality and the value of information verification essentially. Therefore, external auditing is being well known and recognized as playing signal delivering role of company private information. The value of audit assurance is also directly correlated to the audit quality (Willenborg 1999). In other words, the better audit quality is, the lower information risk of financial statement people may have. Then the risk of stock transaction premium will be mitigated accordingly. That’s the value of information role how external auditor can perform. This study is to investigate how information value of auditing can be beneficial to the level of lowering information asymmetry, and how to prove the value of audit information, as an interesting and known subject in the securities of Taiwan. From previous studies, most of them take audit quality as proxy variable of the risk of information asymmetry, to evaluate the economic impact on capital cost, then to project indirectly that higher audit quality indicates lower level of information asymmetry which can make enterprises lower their capital cost. Comparing previous studies other authors made, this paper takes the probability of information-base trading (referring to PIN), which is captured from information transaction frequency of business proprietary, to measure the level of firm’s information asymmetry directly. In this paper, audit firms, audit tenure, the discretionary accruals and the experts in audit market are selected as proxy variables of audit quality for empirical simulation. This paper complements the connection between audit quality and information asymmetry which were not formulated by previous literatures. This addition is expected to be beneficial to the teaching of the audit, the further into the future can serve as a researcher for the information economy and the combination of the basis of the audit market segment.