本計畫第一年擬考慮一個包含一家技術領先的本國廠商、一家技術落後的本國廠商與 外國廠商的一個兩國三廠的國際授權模型，藉此模型來討論存在環境污染下，一家擁 有較佳技術的本國廠商如何選擇其的授權對象，並分析不同的授權方式對授權廠商的 選擇與污染稅的制定會產生何種影響。接著，在計畫第一年的架構下，本計畫第二年 擬擴充為一個存在工會下的國際授權模型，以討論當存在工會組織時，若政府必須考 慮本國勞工的就業問題，則工會的存在對本國技術領先廠商的授權決策與本國政府的 污染稅決定有何影響。最後，由於許多授權廠商的關鍵零組件多為一個或少數中間財 廠商掌握，因此本計畫擬在第一年的架構下於第三年，討論中間財廠商的訂價對本國 技術領先廠商的授權決策與本國政府的污染稅決定有何影響。 This project establishes a technology licensing model which includes a domestic firm with high technology, a domestic firm with low technology and a foreign firm with low technology to discuss the relationship between firm’s licensing strategy and environmental policy under the different scenarios. The three firms produce the products with emissions and engage in Cournot competition in the domestic model. In first year, we want to use the basic model to answer the following questions. First, this proposal wants to analyze that whether the decision of firm’s licensing strategies will change or not when a government imposes a emission tax on the firm. Second, this proposal can discuss the impacts of licensing decision of firm on emission tax and welfare when firm decide to license or not first, and then government decides emission tax to maximize welfare. Finally, we also want to examine whether the optimal licensing strategy that maximizes the profits of patent-holder is consistent with that maximizes the social welfare. In the second year and the third year, we will extend the basic model to discuss the impact of the labor union and of the intermediate goods firm on licensing strategy and emission tax in turn.
