| 摘要: | 1951年4月11日，杜魯門政府在凌晨臨時宣布了麥克阿瑟將軍的解職命令，而這個決定在國際社會與美國國內皆引起了軒然大波。1950年代初期亞洲赤焰高漲，韓戰的爆發也證明了西方盟國對蘇聯共產勢力擴張的憂慮其來有自。美國國內此時也在「中國遊說團」和「麥卡錫主義」的推波助瀾下，對杜魯門政府的外交政策大肆抨擊。究竟什麼因素使得杜魯門將麥帥的解職視為一個必須在如此嚴峻的國內外環境下，必須立即完成的決策，則為本論文試圖解答並深入分析的重點。
本論文採用艾里遜所提出的三個決策模式，即「理性行為者模式」、「組織行為模式」與「政府政治模式」作為理論架構。透過這三種模式的分析，學生將從國際國內環境、政府內部組織間的運作以及政府內部官僚合作競爭等角度切入分析杜魯門政府解職麥克阿瑟的決策過程。經過理性行為者模式之分析，本論文發現，杜魯門與麥克阿瑟對於當時美國國家安全和利益的認知有很大的出入，兩人所採取的政策也截然不同。由於杜魯門政府在冷戰對峙的國際情勢下，小心翼翼地處理外交問題即是為了避免引發第三次世界大戰，可是，麥克阿瑟卻在韓國戰事中行事過於莽撞，終使杜魯門考慮其解職。經過組織行為模式之分析，本論文發現，由於國務院與國防部的組織文化不同，使得此二部門形塑出截然不同的組織次文化，即「反蔣」與「援助亞洲盟友」，造成它們在遠東政策上相互競爭，而白宮過於倚重國務院的外交專業，使得國防部與遠東司令部居於劣勢。在韓戰中，遠東司令部不遵循國防部的標準作業程序的行徑讓國防部與參聯會處境尷尬，漸漸地孤立了遠東司令部在決策圈中的地位。經過政府政治模式之分析，本論文發現，華府終的決策參與者們深知解職麥帥可能帶來一場政治風暴，在考量自身政治利益、組織利益以及總統利益後躊躇不前，雖然在解職麥帥一事上早有共識，卻不敢輕舉妄動。因此，根據學者喬治的總統決策模式分析，杜魯門總統的決策風格在此時即展露無遺，他重視循規蹈矩、權責分明的官僚間互動，不尋求共識決以及勇於承擔決策後果等特質，大大地影響了麥帥解職的決定。
經過以上三種決策模式的分析，本論文可以解答為何杜魯門政府在韓戰中毅然決然地解職麥克阿瑟。杜魯門政府認為，麥帥在韓戰中的行徑已經危及美國國家安全與利益，他公開批評華府的政策則已踰越其軍人的分際與文人領軍的傳統。遠東司令部不遵循國防部的標準作業程序，讓政府內組織難以掌控韓國戰事，則進一步惡化遠東司令部與華府部門的關係。最後，杜魯門將麥克阿瑟的舉動視為對其總統權威的挑戰，在獲得軍方與參聯會關鍵的意見背書後，決定將麥帥解職。
The Truman administration announced General Douglas MacArthur’s dismissal in the early hours of April 11th, 1951, and the decision announced in such a dramatic way shocked the United States and abroad. The Far East was on the edge on falling behind the Iron Curtain at the dawn of 1950s, and the outbreak of Korean conflict again showed the Western allies the invasive nature of the Soviet-led Communism. Furthermore, the Truman administration’s foreign policy was under severe attack from the public opinion as a result of the “China Lobby” movement and the reign of “McCarthyism.” Under what circumstances, and influenced by what factors did the Truman administration deem the dismissal of General MacArthur a necessity is the primary goal of this thesis.
The author will apply Graham Allison’s three models of decision-making theory, namely the “Rational Actor Model,” the “Organizational Behavior Model,” and the “Governmental Politics Model” to analyze the dismissal of General MacArthur. Under the guidance of RAM, the thesis finds that the recognition of the United States’ national security and interests between Truman and MacArthur was clearly different, so was the policy they took respectively to defend those interests. The Truman administration was extremely cautious while handling the Cold War; however, MacArthur was ruining the efforts made to prevent a third world war by Washington in the Korean war and this made the president inevitably dimissed him. Under the guidance of OBM, the thesis finds that the difference between the State and Defense Departments in respect of organizational culture formulated respectively two distinguished organizational subcultures, namely the “anti-Chiang” and the “assisting Asian allies.” The White House was siding with the State Department in the organizational horizontal competition while the Defense Department was leaning towards the State Department after the Far East Command (FEC) showed its unwillingness to comply with its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in the Korean war, leaving the FEC insolated in the decision-making circle. Under the guidance of GPM, the thesis finds that the participants in the dismissal of General MacArthur were well aware of the consequences, and after considering their own political interests, organizational interests as well as the presidential interests they did not take any action, even though they already had a consensus that General MacArthur should be relieved.Therefore, according to Alexander George’s analysis, President Truman’s decision-making characteristics played a primary role in MacArthur’s dismissal.
Applying the three decision-making models, the thesis provides an answer to General MacArthur’s dimissal by analyzing thoroughly the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Obviously, President Truman regarded General MacArthur’s behaviors a threat to the US’ national security and interests, and public criticism over Washington’s foreign policy was clearly over his duty as a professional soldier. The FEC’s unwillingness to comply with the Defense Department’s SOPs not only left Washington no control over the battlefields on the Korean peninsula but also worsen its relationship with other organizations in Washington. Finally, President Truman regarded MacArthur’s behaviors as a challenge to the presidential authority, which might ultimately undermine the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, after acquiring the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of all his duties. |
