| 摘要: | 二戰後，世界朝向美蘇兩強對峙的道路邁進，開啟了冷戰兩極體系的年代。受制於雅爾達體系，美國雖深感蘇聯在東歐地區的擴張威脅卻是束手無策。在亞洲的中國，陷入一場生存戰。國民黨與中國共產黨從邊打邊談到全面開戰，1948年起，國府敗象已現。1949年初，中共渡江佔領南京，同年10月毛澤東於北平（後改名北京）宣告中共建政後，迫使蔣介石政權撤守台灣。隨著中國政權易主，美國對華政策面臨抉擇，華府與國府的關係也來到了歷史的轉捩點。
1948年6月，蘇聯公開將南斯拉夫領導人狄托暨南共逐出共產黨情報局。此一舉動不僅震撼向來深信狄托與史達林是絕對從屬關係的美國與西方各國，也啟發了杜魯門政府「狄托主義，中國生根」的政策思維。自史迪威事件以降，華府與國府的嫌隙漸生。受到南斯拉夫經驗的鼓舞，美國傾向與蔣介石政權劃清界線，與此同時保留與中共對話的窗口。因此，自1949年中共攻陷南京後，杜魯門政府多次嘗試與中共高層進行會晤，企圖動搖中共對蘇聯的信心，藉以期望毛澤東成為「亞洲狄托」，以收「聯中制蘇」之效。直到1950年6月韓戰爆發，美國方大夢初醒。
援用美國政治學者艾里遜所提出之「決策理論三模式」，即理性模式、組織行為模式以及政府政治模式作為本論文之基本架構與論據，針對1949年至1950年6月杜魯門政府嘗試聯中（共）制蘇的決策過程進行抽絲剝繭，藉由歷史重建的途徑，儘可能地貼近事實並對本論文進行深入剖析與闡釋。透過「決策三模式」之引導與反覆驗證，可知杜魯門政府嘗試聯中制蘇的思維乃是經由國家利益與福祉的理性評估、組織受到內部文化薰陶造成立場相異而生的競爭以及官僚之間進行議價與妥協的過程而出的產物。此外，本論文同時援用美國政治學者喬治所歸納之「總統決策模式」輔以檢視杜魯門總統的角色定位、人格特質與價值觀所形塑之決策風格對決策過程所產生之影響。
在假設驗證的過程中，本論文得出一項發現。1949年中國正值新舊政權交替，受到1948年史達林與狄托的公開決裂帶給美國的啟示：「共產集團並非鐵板一塊」，南斯拉夫經驗或許可在中國歷史重演，美國便可成功爭取中共獨立於蘇聯之外，進而實現「聯中制蘇」的戰略思維。誠然，以後世的角度觀之，杜魯門政府這般嘗試「聯中制蘇」的戰略思維似乎有點過於樂觀，並不合乎理性抉擇。然而，就當時的時空背景而論，美國受制於冷戰氛圍與美中（指國府）矛盾，所能展現的僅能是「有限理性」。是故，美國雖對中共存在不確定性，本著「聯合次要敵人，打擊主要敵人」，說明杜魯門政府當時「以中共制蘇共」的戰略思維乃其來有自。
美國與近代中國的複雜關係，構築了東西文化和外交史上最奪目亦最爭議的一頁。在共享的冷戰氛圍下，所謂「天時不如地利、地利不如人和」，杜蔣不睦自個人層次延燒到了國家層次，甚至是國際層次。在這般前提之下，也許美國始終把對華政策從屬於美蘇對立或東西方集團對抗的考量之下。從錯誤的前提出發，以失敗告終亦勢所必然。對歷史真相的探求並非為「論功過」或「論對錯」，而是期待「鑑往知來」。
After the Second World War, a bipolar world, known as the Cold War Era, has been clearly formed between the Western Bloc and Communist Bloc while the United States and the Soviet Union at the peak on each side. In Eastern Europe, the United States was restrained and felt helpless about Soviet expansion in this area with the perception of Yalta system. On the other hand, in Asia, with the breakdown of talks, an all-out war resumed. A Chinese civil war fought between Kuomintang (also as KMT or Chinese National Party) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the end of 1948, KMT has occupied the inferior position. In the early period of 1949, CCP forces crossed the Yangtze River and successfully captured Nanking, the capital of KMT’s Republic of China (PRC) government. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with its capital at Beiping, which was renamed Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek and millions of Nationalist Chinese retreated from mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Confronted with the CCP takeover of mainland China, the United States came to reformulate its China Policy which later marked a turning point in Sino-American relationship during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950.
In June 1948, the leader of Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, was officially denounced and his party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), was ejected as a member of the Cominform by the Soviet Union. Since the West branded Tito a Soviet puppet for his loyalty and constancy of faith to Stalinism, the Tito-Stalin Split presented a whole new realm of possibilities to the United States for its dilemma in china—“Chinese Titoism.” With the influence of Stilwell Incident over Sino-American relationship and the facts of Tito-Stalin Split, Truman made an about-face change to U.S. China Policy in 1949. By the early 1949, the Truman Administration has already been making plans to diverge from Chiang and his KMT such as the publication of China White Paper; at the same time, Truman Administration keeping making chances to have conversations with the CCP. By meeting and negotiating with the CCP officials, Truman Administration attempted to disunite Communist China and the Soviet Union, expected Mao to be the “Asian Tito,” and then Communist China can joint forces with the United States to fight against the Soviet Union, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Until the outbreak of Korean War in June 1950, the United States finally realized that what it faced is hostile china along with the Sino-Soviet partnership.
By applying Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure and basis, the thesis would step by step explore the decision-making process of Truman Administration in engaging China to counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950 through the perspectives of the rational assessment and choice on national interest, struggles between/among organizations based on different target and organizational culture, and pulling, hauling and bargaining games among relative bureaucrats. In addition, the thesis also applied the principles from Alexander L. George’s book, Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy, to aim at examining how President Truman’s, who has the final say, character, personality, value and world views made effect in the decision-making process of the target case study.
In the process of theory confirming, the thesis discovered that by the period of transformation of Chinese regimes in 1949, the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 presented the United States a new inspiration for the Communist World, that is, the Eastern Bloc is not a rigid “Iron Curtain.” Truman Administration considered that Titoism may set its roots upon China, the Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict could be a replay situation that occurred in mainland China, and both would put the strategic thought—Engaging China to counter the Soviet Threat—into practice. Nevertheless, from the historical perspectives, this kind of strategic thought seemed over-optimistic, which did not conform to fully rational considerations. However, with regard to the background of the early Cold War Era and the suspicion between the Truman Administration and KMT, the alternative that the United States took reflected the principles of “bounded rationality model.” As a result, by examining the decision-making process of Truman Administration in engaging China to counter the threat from the Soviet Union during the period of 1949 to the middle 1950, what the thesis explored not only the facts about the Sino-American relationship in this period, but also the continuity and change of Truman’s China Policy along with its cause and effect. |
