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    Title: Essays on spatial competition, vertical differentiation, delegation game and technology licensing
    Other Titles: 有關空間競爭、垂直異質、代理賽局與技術授權之論文集
    Authors: 曾靜枝;Tseng, Ching-chih
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系博士班
    梁文榮;Liang, Wen-jung
    Keywords: 空間聚集;二維空間模型;垂直異質;區位選擇;代理賽局;相對績效誘因指標;Bertrand 價格競爭;Cournot 數量競爭;貿易障礙;單位權利金授權;固定權利金授權;Spatial Agglomeration;Two-dimensional Framework;Vertical Differentiation;Location Choice;Delegation Game;Relative-performance Incentive Scheme;Trade Barriers;Fixed-Fee Licensing;Royalty Licensing
    Date: 2010
    Issue Date: 2010-09-23 15:27:29 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 此博士論文由三篇獨立論文組合而成,均為國貿或產業經濟理論與區域經濟模型結合的論文。第一篇論文為 “Spatial Agglomeration with Vertical Differentiation”,採用一個二維 (two dimensional) 空間模型,假設廠商從事 Bertrand 價格競爭,探討垂直異質〈即品質差異〉對廠商區位選擇的影響。此篇文章發現若二廠商進行差別取價之價格競爭,當產品的垂直異質程度夠大時,二廠商會聚集在市場中點且不會從事削價競爭,Hotelling (1929) 的最小差異化法則仍可成立;反之,當產品的垂直異質程度夠小時,二廠商會選擇分離,且垂直異質程度愈小則二廠商距離愈遠。若二廠商進行單一傳送價格與出廠價格之價格競爭時,二廠商聚集市場中點是唯一區位均衡解。此外,即使考慮品質決策內生化,區位均衡解仍成立。
      第二篇論文為 “Location Choice with Delegation: Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition”,探討企業擁有者 (owner) 從事代理賽局 (delegated game) 時的區位選擇。傳統區域文獻指出,若產品為同質產品,當廠商進行 Bertrand 價格競爭時,其最適區位為分離解,若從事  Cournot 數量競爭則為聚集解。由於區位為長期決策不易改變,而競爭策略為短期決策可隨時調整,故若設廠成本很高,則對廠商的區位選擇造成極大的困擾。此篇文章發現若企業擁有者採用相對績效誘因指標 (relative-performance incentive scheme),則在Bertrand 價格競爭時,其誘因參數 (incentive parameter) 為正值,可降低二經營者 (managers) 之競爭程度;在 Cournot 數量競爭時,其誘因參數為負值,可提高二經營者之競爭程度。因此均衡時,二企業擁有者不論在 Bertrand 或 Cournot 競爭下之最適區位選擇均相同。此外,在線性運輸成本設定下,當二企業擁有者的區位分別坐落於 [1/4, 3/7] 與 [4/7, 3/4] 時,其二經營者不會從事削價競爭,此一結果與 D’Aspremont et al. (1979) 顯著不同。
      第三篇論文為 “Fee versus Royalty Licensing in Bertrand Competition in the Presence of Trade Barriers”,傳統授權文獻指出,若廠商從事 Bertrand 價格競爭,在技術創新程度小時,市場外的技術擁有者 (outside patent holder) 的技術授權必為單位權利金授權優於固定權利金授權。本篇文章採用一個二國模型,考慮二國間存在關稅及運輸成本等貿易障礙,二廠商從事同質 Bertrand 價格競爭時,市場外技術擁有者之最適授權策略。此篇文章發現存在貿易障礙會使地主國廠商享有超額利潤,當貿易障礙相對創新程度夠大時,固定權利金授權會優於單位權利金授權且市場外的技術擁有者在固定權利金授權時會選擇授權給二廠商。
    The dissertation consists of three independent papers. All of them employ both spatial models and techniques of industrial economics. The first paper is “Spatial Agglomeration with Vertical Differentiation”. This paper constructs a two-dimensional framework to take into consideration both the location (horizontal differentiation) and vertical (quality) differentiation. The focus of the paper is on the impact of vertical (quality) differentiation on the location configuration of firms. It shows that while the Principle of Minimum Differentiation in location may be supported, the Principle of Maximum Differentiation in location can never apply if firms engage in spatially discriminatory pricing. This paper proves that spatial agglomeration gives rise to the unique location equilibrium in both cases where firms charge uniform delivered and mill prices. Moreover, the location equilibria remain unchanged as quality is also endogenously determined.
    The title of the second paper is “Location Choice with Delegation: Bertrand vs. Cournot Competition”. We argue in the paper that conventional wisdom indicates that firms’ optimal locations are sensitive to the modes of product-market competition leading to a difficulty for firms to make concrete location decisions. This difficulty is especially crucial for the high entry-cost firms. The paper develops an uncovered-market model a la Economides (1984) to explore this sensitivity by taking into account a delegated game with relative-performance incentive scheme. It shows that this difficulty can be solved, as owners adopt a delegated game with relative-performance incentive scheme. Moreover, the paper shows that owners have no incentive to engage in price undercutting as owner 1 locates within the interval [1/4, 3/7] and owner 2 within the interval [4/7, 3/4], which is in sharp different from that in D’Aspremont et al. (1979) as the symmetric location assumption is given.
    The third paper is “Fee versus Royalty Licensing in Bertrand Competition in the Presence of Trade Barriers”. This paper develops a two-country (barbell) model to take into account trade barriers in exploring the outside patentee’s optimal licensing policy under Bertrand competition with homogenous product. Four different policies, exclusive or non-exclusive, royalty or fixed-fee licensing, are considered. The focus of the paper is on the impact of monopoly profit generated by trade barriers. It shows that fixed-fee licensing is superior to royalty licensing under Bertrand competition, as trade costs relative to the innovation reduced marginal cost are higher, while the reverse emerges, otherwise. It also shows that the outside patentee would select fixed-fee licensing non-exclusively, as trade costs relative to the innovation reduced marginal cost are higher
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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