| 摘要: | 美台在1954年12月2日簽署之「中美共同防禦條約」，維護台灣免於中共武力攻擊，奠定台灣往後數十年安全穩定之基礎。此項在冷戰期間簽署的防約，體現美台對付共同威脅，互蒙利害之緊密雙邊關係。然而，對國府而言，該條約的簽訂過程似乎並不順利。冷戰伊始，美國為防堵共產勢力擴張，分別與亞洲各國簽訂雙邊或多邊聯盟條約，形成圍堵共產勢力的太平洋聯防體系。但隨著韓戰停戰及中南半島情勢初步底定，華府卻仍遲遲不願與中華民國簽訂雙邊協防條約。
本論文以艾里遜 (Graham T. Allison) 之決策理論，亦即「理性行為者模式、組織行為模式、政府政治模式」為主要分析架構，並參酌國際體系理論及聯盟理論，提出若干假設，以檢視相關理論對本論文之適用性。主要資料來源為美國國家檔案局、艾森豪總統圖書館及國務院編輯出版之FRUS系列之解密美國政府官方文件。此外，美台相關決策參與官員之回憶錄亦為相關參考資料來源。前開資料對於重建防約起源、政策考量及談判過程等事實真相，均甚有助益。
由理性行為者模式觀之，國際情勢變動為重要因素。美國艾森豪政府因恐拖往一場與中共的戰爭，本無意與國府簽署防約。惟其態度在第一次台海危機爆發後改變。以權力平衡角度觀之，此是國家合力對付已經或即將出現的衝突與威脅之結果，美台即在冷戰期間合作以對抗共黨勢力擴張。
由組織決策模式的角度來看，政府是由許多專責部門所構成，每個部門均盼掌握決策影響力，在本案例中，軍方主張強硬回應台海危機之建議未被採納，最後由國務卿杜勒斯主導的聯合國安理會停火案及與國府締約的雙管齊下策略獲得青睞。而國務院遠東事務局及美國駐台大使館及相關官員諸如遠東事務助卿羅柏森(Walter S. Robertson)、駐台大使藍欽 (Karl L. Rankin)及中國科科長馬康衛（Walter P. McConaughy）爭取與國府簽署防約甚力，凸顯主管地域局及駐地使館之決策影響力。
政府政治模式則可檢視各行政部門主事者之間權力拔河以及決策參與者與總統間互動關係。對艾森豪外交政策影響至鉅的國務卿杜勒斯是本案例主導人物，杜勒斯掌握與艾森豪總統之間的行動管道，其提出由紐西蘭在安理會提出解決外島軍事危機決議案的構想，最後被採納成為政策。
本論文研究指出，艾森豪政府雖因不願捲入與中共的戰爭而遲未與中華民國簽訂共同防禦條約，但因第一次台海危機爆發等國際情勢變遷，促使美國改變立場，進而同意在條約適用範圍僅限台澎，不包括金馬外島，以及國府不得擅以武力攻擊中共之條件下，與國府簽署防禦條約。
In the context of the Cold War, the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, concluded on December 2, 1954, secured the ROC from invasion by the PRC in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War. Thus, for Taiwan, it laid the foundation of security and stability for decades.
Signed in the Cold War era, this treaty represented an embodiment of the close relationships between the US and the ROC in terms of their shared interest in coping with communism. However, from the perspective of the ROC, the process of signing this treaty seemed to be a rugged one. On the one hand, at the onset of the Cold War, the US endeavored to form a Pacific united front to contain communism by concluding a series of bilateral or multilateral security treaties with a few Asian countries. On the other hand, with the armistice reached in the Korea Peninsula and the situation of Indochina primarily stabilized, the US was still reluctant to enter into a defense treaty with the ROC.
This dissertation aims to analyze the decision-making process of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty on Graham Allison’s three decision-making models, namely, the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM), together with the theories of the international systems and alliance. Hypotheses are generated accordingly to examine the application of the relevant theories. Meanwhile, the primary sources for this dissertation are declassified US government documents available at the National Archives, the Eisenhower Presidential Library, and the FRUS series edited by the Department of States, as well as the biographies and memoirs of both American and Taiwan’s government officials involved in the decision-making process. All these sources have made possible a reconstruction of the initiation, consideration, and negotiation of this treaty.
Concerning the RAM, the Eisenhower administration had no intention to enter into a security treaty with the ROC because it was unwilling to be dragged by this treaty into a major war with mainland China. However, unfriendly elements from the communist bloc created a necessity for the agreement. Among those elements, the offshore islands were an ignition point. The first Taiwan Strait Crisis became a crucial incident that expedited the conclusion of US-ROC security treaty. From the view of balance of power, this treaty politically acted to oppose the communist coalition, which tended to pursue a position of predominance.
In the light of the OBM, government leaders rely on the standard operating procedures (SOP) of governmental organizations to obtain policy alternatives. Therefore, all governmental organizations seek to have influence to pursue their objectives. Their positions on issues are affected by the desire to maintain influence. From this point of view, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, American Embassy in the Republic of China, and Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Karl L. Rankin, Ambassador to the ROC, and Walter P. McConaughy, Director for the Office of Chinese Affairs in the State Department, advocated the treaty with full efforts. Meanwhile, Eisenhower apparently preferred the State Department’s proposal to ask New Zealand to bring up a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council to solve the so-call “horrible dilemma”. Thus, the Department of Defense’s previous tough proposal to respond to the Taiwan Strait Crisis was rejected by President Eisenhower because it was thought to be too risky.
From the perspective of the GPM, a nation''s actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders. The decision-making process is usually regarded as a tug-of-war among government officials. Just like playing a game, in every decision-making process, players try to win the support of the president by pulling and hauling at each other. In this regard, Secretary of State John F. Dulles’s action-channel to President Eisenhower made him a dominant figure in the entire process. The idea of cease-fire proposal to UN brought up by Dulles, while agreeing to negotiate the defense treaty with the ROC, was adopted as the final policy of the US.
This dissertation indicates that although the Eisenhower Administration, unwilling to be involved in a major war against the PRC, was reluctant to conclude a mutual defense treaty with the ROC. However, after the outbreak of the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US changed its position and finally decided to sign the defense treaty on the condition that this treaty was limited in application to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores only, with Quemoy and Matsu not protected, and that the ROC was prevented from initiating any military action against mainland China. |
