儘管經濟制裁於第二次世界大戰後,廣泛的被各國所用,不過關於其抑制戰爭效力的有無,卻是眾說紛紜。本文主要在探討經濟制裁與軍事衝突間的關係,在怎麼樣的規模及強度的經濟制裁會導致軍事衝突的發生怎麼樣的規模及強度的經濟制裁又會有效的避免軍事衝突?運用經驗法則與實證研究出來的結果做比較,估算出將衝突可能性降到最小之數值 The power of the weapon in this generation is getting stronger and stronger. Pushing every country to think about other way to solve the international dispute without military conflict. Economic sanctions become a good option for this situation. The United State has become the country which use economic sanctions mostly as a tool on foreign affaire. Since 1960, the document and the literature of economic sanctions has getting more and more important. It includes many different point of view to descried and analyze economic sanctions.
From the sender’s point of view, sanctions are meant as a tool to prevent conflict. Having failed at diplomacy, the sender must choose between war and capitulation. Sanctions provide an intermediate position which signals to the target the sender’s resolve. If sanctions are too light, then there may be a high probability of conflict due to the utter loss of reputation of the sender and the hardening of the attitude of the target. Light sanctions will be seen as weakness and conflict will then be needed to shore up this perceived weakness. Heavy sanctions can also be associated with a high probability of conflict. Indeed a straight out blockade of a target may be thought of as low intensity conflict itself. However, from the target’s point of view, conflict may be the only recourse in the face of extreme sanctions that threaten the regime. Seen in this way, the intensity of sanctions is not monotonically related to the likelihood of conflict. Low sanctions lead to high probabilities of war, while stiff sanctions also lead to a high probability of war. In this thesis we try to find the cost of the target which can make the lowest probability of military conflict through binary logit model and ordered logit model. Make useful suggestions to the similar research in the future.