本計劃擬將產品品質納入Brander and Spencer (1985)模型中，並藉以分析成本與品 質差異對出口補貼之影響。根據策略性出口補貼理論（如De Meza (1986)），高成本國 家應給予其成本較低之出口品補貼。惟在實務上高成本國家（如美國之鋼鐵與棉花）大 都給予其出口品最高之補貼。很明顯地，策略性出口補貼之文獻並無法解釋此一現象。 本計劃擬將產品品質納入策略性出口補貼模型，並藉以解釋為什麼高成本國家會對其出 口品給予較高之出口補貼，以及品質差異對出口國最適補貼政策之影響。 The purpose of this project is to introduce product quality into Brander and Spencer』s (1985) model and to analyze the impacts of cost as well as quality differences on export subsidies. According to the strategic trade theory (for example, see De Meza(1986)), the countries with the lowest costs will set the highest subsidies. However, in reality the high cost countries (for example, U.S. steel and cotton) very often tend to offer high subsidies. Apparently, the strategic theory of export subsidies is unable to explain this phenomenon. This project intends to introduce product quality into the strategic model of export subsidies. Our result will explain why countries with the highest cost tend to offer the highest subsidies and explore the effect of product quality difference on the optimal export policies of the exporting countries.