第一年計畫擬建立一個理論模型，討論本國公營廠商釋股給外國民營廠商的情況，試圖找出最適釋股比例。接著利用中國大陸的資料，從事實証分析，估算釋股比例大小對中國大陸社會福利的影響效果。 第二年計畫擬根據Janaba (1996)的基本架構發展一個外國來源公司所得的課稅模型，分析商品市場在不完全競爭下，本國(台灣)多國籍廠商前往外國(如中國)設立子公司，並與外國廠商如生產同質商品，並將商品同時出口到第三國市場(如美國)。我們要探討差別稅率如何訂定，以及地主國(及外國)採取兩稅合一政策對該國社會福利的影響效果。最後，利用中國的資料予以驗証。 第三年計畫擬假定本國有一家為追求社會福利極大的公營廠商及m家追求利潤極大的民營廠商，以及有n家追求利潤的外國廠商，彼此在第三國市場從事Cournot數量競爭，分析本國政府採取出口補貼政策的有效性，而且探討本國政府推動民營化政策的影響效果。 In the first year project, we consider a quantity-setting oligopoly model involving a domestic public firm and m domestic private firms and n foreign private firms. We explicit allow the possibility of partial privatization in which the domestic government sells parts of shares in the public firm to the foreign private firm and investigate the optimal proportion of shares in privatized firm the government should hold. Then we examine the impact of partial privatization on domestic welfare. Empirical analysis is also conducted by using China』s data. In the second year project, we will introduce corporate taxation into a model with imperfect competition and foreign direct investment in the spirit of Janeba(1996). We will develop a simple oligopoly model with two firms and two countries. One firm is a multinational company which is located in the home country, the home firm, but produces through a subsidiary in the foreign country, which is also called the host country. We first derive the optimal discriminatory corporate tax rates and then examine the effect on the host country』s welfare if the discriminatory corporate tax rates are substituted by a uniform corporate tax rate. Empirical study is also conducted by using China』s data. In the third year, we consider a third market for a homogeneous good, competed by one domestic public firms, m domestic private firms, and n foreign private firms in Cournot quantity competition. We will examine the efficacy of export subsidy pursued by domestic government and the impact of privatization policy on domestic welfare.
