本研究探討實施就業保護對薪資的影響。實施就業保護使解雇成本增加，造成勞動市場的流動降低，引發逆向選擇與道德危機的問題。雇主在增聘新員工時，因預期雇用到較差勞動力的機率變高，而選擇給付較低的薪資；雇主對其既有員工，也因就業保護的實施使效率工資失效，亦傾向以較低的薪資來面對無可避免的道德危機。因此我們認為實施就業保護後，薪資將會全面的下降。而實施就業保護後造成的薪資下降，其背後隱含勞資雙方的工作契合度降低。 本研究使用1979年至1995年的人力資源調查與人力運用調查資料進行實證分析。我們利用Regression Discontinuity Design方法設定實證模型，分析就業保護對起始薪資與年資較長員工薪資的影響。同時，本研究以工具變數法處理廠商員工數的內生選擇問題，並以分量迴歸估計薪資在不同分量下所受到的影響。 This research investigates the effects of employment protection on wages. The introduction of employment protection increases an employer’s firing costs and dampens the labor market turnover rates. The labor market may lead to the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Thus the employer hires new workers at lower wages accounting for the higher possibility of bad job matches, and also offers lower pay to tenure workers for the employees’ moral hazard. This suggests that wages may be reduced after the introduction of employment protection. The wage reduction also implies that the job matches get worse in the labor market. In this research we use a multi-year cross-sectional data from Human Resource Survey and Manpower Utilization Survey to investigate the employment protection effects. Regression Discontinuity Design is employed for our empirical analysis. An instrumental variable strategy is adopted to address the self-selection of firm size, and the quantile regression estimation methods are applied to estimate the impact of the employment protection at different parts of the tenure wage and the starting wage distributions.
