本計畫首先考慮一個包含一家擁有最終財生產技術的中間財廠商、一家低成本與一家高成本最終財廠商的垂直相關市場模型，藉此模型來討論一家擁有最終財生產技術的中間財廠商如何選擇其下游的授權對象，並分析不同的授權方式對中間財廠商的授權選擇又會產生何種影響。此外，本計畫擬擴充為一個貿易模型，利用一個三國（本國、外國與第三國）三廠（一家中間財廠商與兩家最終財廠商）的模型假設第三國有一家擁有最終財生產技術的中間財廠商，本國與外國分別存在一家最終財廠商，本國與外國最終財廠商出口產品至第三國市場進行Cournot數量競爭，在上述設定下，討論垂直授權與貿易政策的關係。 This paper considers a vertical relationship model which includes an intermediate goods (upstream) firm, a low cost and a high cost final goods (downstream) firm. The upstream firm has more efficient final goods production technology than other two final goods firms. We want to discuss that how does an upstream firm decide to license which one downstream firm and analyze the impact of licensing contract (fixed fee and royalty) on the upstream firm＇s decisions in licensing. Furthermore, this model can also be extended to a trade model which includes three countries and three firms (one intermediate goods firm, one domestic and one foreign final goods firm). The intermediate goods firm in the third country has the more efficient final goods production technology than other two final goods firms. There are a final goods firm in the home country and the other one in the foreign country. Both the domestic firm and the foreign one engage in Cournot competition in the third country. By the assumption above, we can explore the relationships between the vertical technological licensing and trade policy by the trade model.