本文主要基於美國公共選擇理論研究的成果，對利益團體、立法者與立法過程三者間的互動關係作一探討。鑑於我國向來對於利益團體政治或利益團體與立法過程之關係的探討，多僅偏向於利益團體如何參與、遊說、施壓於立法者，而少對立法者為何、以何種機制制定有利於特殊利益團體的立法。本文對於利益團體與立法過程之關係，不僅從利益團體的觀點來作探討，亦針對立法過程中立法者的行動模式加以分析，以求對利益團體政治的實態有一均衡的認識。而利益團體政治對社會經濟福利所帶來的效果應如何評價，公共選擇理論式的利益團體論蘊藏何種界限和問題點，亦皆在本文中加以檢討。 Basing on the perspectives from public choice theory, this paper explores the interactions among interest groups, legislators and legislative process (institutions). Up to now, studies on interest group politics or correlation between interest groups and legislative process in Taiwan devote most of their efforts to such subjects as how interest groups participate, lobby, and put pressure on legislators. Points of view as why and how legislators, with what mechanisms, enact statutes pursuant to the advantages of interest groups are largely missed or neglected in these studies. Trying to expose the correlation between interest groups and legislative process more comprehensively, this paper analyzes the legislators' behavior models as well as interest groups' in the legislative process. Analyses of this kind, as the author believes, will bring us a more balancing view about interest group politics. Some ensuing issues such as the economic welfare effects of interest group politics, limits and problems arising out of application of public choice theory to interest group politics, are also discussed in this paper.
Relation:
Proceedings of the National Science Council, Republic of China. Part D, Mathematics, science, and technology education = 國家科學委員會研究彙刊, 科學教育8(4)，頁677-698
