淡江大學機構典藏:Item 987654321/42871
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    jsp.display-item.identifier=請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/42871

    题名: 臺灣與大陸對於兩岸關係定位之認知與比較--「特殊國與國關係論」的意涵、反應與影響
    作者: 潘錫堂
    贡献者: 淡江大學中國大陸研究所
    关键词: 特殊國與國關係論;事務性協商;三光政策;一個中國;務實外交
    日期: 2003
    上传时间: 2010-03-01 16:49:05 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 臺北市:臺灣學生書局
    摘要: 我們如果不能在兩岸進行政治性議題的談判以前,先將自己的定位做好,恐怕上了談判桌後再做就太遲了。政府宣佈「特殊國與國關係論」的方向是正確的,但是時機稍嫌粗糙。事實上自一九尤一年起我們陸續宣佈結束動員勘亂時期、修憲、建立國統綱領以來,我們對兩岸的地位一直採取比較保守的措辭。在一九九一年前後江丙均對兩岸關係的各種解釋只是告訴中共:中華民國的國際人格並沒有因為一九四九年我們喪失對大陸的有效管轄、也沒有因為一九七一年我們退出聯合國而有仕何的喪失我們照樣擁有許多只承認台北卻不承認北京的邦交圓。過去我們對兩關係的定位雖然很模糊,卻依然處處受到中共在國際外交上的打壓, 尤其九八年張京育擔任陸委會主委時中共曾發表的三光政策: 也就是把我們邦交國花光、把國際政治生路搶光和未來在國際政治桌上的籌碼賭光。其後,就我與唐樹備兩次挂面的經驗, 他告訴我大陸方面沒有這樣的想法, 在國際上互搶邦交國是事實, 所以最多只有一光政策, 另外兩光是臺灣自己的推測。無論如何, 國內非常在意中共在國際上打壓我們, 九八年我們和東加王國的邦交因中共而斷、後來我國和馬其頓建交、再演變到今援科索伏和巴紐建交的生變引起國內對務實外交的檢討和質疑,也讓執政當局感到在一個中國的框架下,我們紛實外交難以推展的困境。另一點就是我方也感受到汪道涵來訪之後,由政治性對話導入政洽談判的腳步會加快,事實上辜振甫九八年十月訪問北京和上海與錢其球和江澤民的對話難道沒有涉及政治議題嗎?可是我們卻稱之為建設性對話。事實上在六月二十九日陸委會副主委吳安家在美國,正當陸士達二度提出中程協議,我方將其解讀為事務性協商時,其實美方已有某種程度的不滿。事後吳在接受媒體訪問時曾說,九八年辜訪問大陸其實就是政治性的對話。所以我們如果不能在兩岸進行政治性議題的談判以前,先將自己的定位做好, 恐怕上了談判桌後再做就太遲了 。雖然這次時間還在汪道涵訪台前夕也許快丁點,但是我們在正式談判前, 對自己做出明確的政治定位確有必耍。其實這次政治性宣示的重點不在於強調兩方都是國家, 而是在強調兩方是對等的。中共常表示在涉及到一個中國的政治性談判時,一定不會以他們是中央,我們是地方的態度來對待。但是我們所要的不是求有談判桌上形式化的對等而已, 我們要的是在談的形式、談的過程與談的可能的協商過程和結果都有對等的實質。我剛參加大陸的一個學術研討會回來, 大陸的學者和官員都不解李如果要發表「特殊國與國關係論J 為何不選在汪訪台之後, 那時發表雖然也會有衝擊,但是不至於像現在這樣, 連汪會不會來都不確定。以我的推測,大陸權衡這整件事情的利弊得失後的反應應該只會停留在一系列的文批上,還不至大肆武嚇,因為中共還是會考慮美國的態度。雖然美國一再重申一個中國的政策,但是也堅持兩岸的問題要以和平的方式解決。同時中共也在觀察中華民國是否會做出較和緩的解釋,尤其是辜振甫的反應,像他們就說李先生以前好像常說錯話,但是這次好像有很多官員替他背書,所以中共這次很在意辜振甫的反應。如果我們此次沒有在大陸政策上做結構性的改變,而只做政治性的宣示,中共的反應應會漸趨和緩。至於汪道涵訪台應會採拖延暫緩的方式,二000年下半年,我想最後還是會成行,因為汪道涵的訪台是目前兩岸深度政治性協商的唯一堆手。
    I think that if we don't establish our position before we begin negotiation of political issues, it will be too late when we're already at the table. I think that the government's announcement of the stateto- state doctrine is going in the right direction, but I think the timing could have been better. In fact, since 1991,we have one after another announced the end of the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, amended the constitution and established the National Unification Guidelines. And we have been quite careful in choosing the wording regarding the status between the two sides. Around 1991 ,P.K.Chiang was essentially telling China through various measures: our independent and sovereign status has in no way been compromised neither by our loss of control over China in 1949 and nor by our having to pull out of the U.N. in 1971- there are still a number of countries that formally recognize Taipei and not Beijing. Although we had .a very ambiguous way of defining our relationship to China, we continued to have to deal with pressure exerted by Beijing internationallyespecially when Chang King-yu was chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council and China had its policy of stripping Taiwan on three fronts: wresting a number or our diplomatic allies, blockading all routes of political survival for Taiwan, and taking away any of our remaining international bargaining chips. Later, I spoke with Tang Shubei on two occasions and he said that isn't the way China was thinking. It's true, he said, that China had a policy of luring away Taiwanese diplomatic allies, but the other two policies existed only in the minds of Taiwanese. No matter what the actual policy was, Taiwanese people pay a lot of attention to any pressure exerted on Taiwan by China internationally, Last year, we severed ties with the Kingdom of Tonga because of China, and later we established ties with Macedonia, which evolved into suspicion of our pragmatic motives when it came to giving aid to Kosovo and establishing diplomatic relations with Papua New Guinea. I think that if we don't establish our position before we begin negotiation of political issues, it will be too late when we're already at the table. Perhaps this announcement was made too soon before Wang Daohan' s visit, but it is necessary that we spell out our political position clearly before formal negotiations. In reality, the stress of the recent announcement isn't on the fact that both parties are countries, but that they are equal. Now it isn't even certain that Wang will come. 1 would guess that China's reaction after all will be U.S. continues to reiterate its adherence to the one-China policy, it also persists in wanting to find a peaceful resolution to cross-strait problems. At the same time, China will also be looking to see if we offer a toned-down explanation-Koo Chen-fu's reaction will be particularly important. In the past, President Lee seemed to make mistakes once a while, but many officials noW appear to be offering their endorsements ... so China will pay special attention to Koo Chen-fu's reaction. If we don't make structural changes to our China policy-if we only make political pronouncements-then the Chinese reaction will be attenuated. Wang Daohan may delay or postpone his autumn visit, but 1 think the will come in the end since a visit from him is the only way for both sides to deepen the level of cross-strait negotiations.
    關聯: 世紀之交 : 觀念動向與文化變遷/第二屆中瑞漢學國際學術會議論文集,頁147-174
    显示于类别:[中國大陸研究所] 會議論文


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