新聞自由與公平審判，兩者均為保障人民之基本權利，彼此間本不相悖，惟衡諸實際情況，一旦個案發生後，尤其受高度矚目且傳播媒體廣泛大規模報導、評論的司法案件，於案件偵查中或訴訟審理時，對於不利於案件相關當事人的報導、評論，甚至證據之揭露，皆會引起是否對於司法案件當事人公平審判權利有所損害之爭議。 言論自由與新聞自由皆為建構形成民主社會所不可或缺之基本要素。從而民主國家致力於維護言論自由與新聞自由，使其有廣泛充分表現行為活動之範疇，誠屬當然。我國對於言論自由意義詮釋與保障範圍之立場，於司法院大法官作成之解釋文中可知，其採取不干預且傾向開放的態度，秉持著給予言論自由作最有利之認定解釋。惟並不因此認定我國對於言論自由即採取絕對之保護，意即不代表言論自由係不受限制，享有絕對之自由。 言論自由並非毫無限制之情形下，當其損害到案件相關當事人公平審判權利時，此時，將針對新聞自由與公平審判之衝突問題對於相關當事人致生不公平之情事與其公平審判權利有損害之情形，援引外國法院之若干判例，來加以說明，何以案件相關當事人之公平審判權利須加以保障。 本論文除分析、釐清公平審判與新聞自由兩者間錯綜複雜之衝突態樣外，當事關人民公平審判之基本權利與民主政治所賴以維繫之新聞自由，產生扞格效果時，應如何取捨或調和，並考慮有無達到雙贏可能性，希冀新聞自由與公平審判兩者間，皆能以保障人民權利的前提下，尋求制度衡平、法益平衡之措施。 The fair trial concerns raised by unrestrained press coverage are not new. Despite repeated efforts at reform and reexamination of the roles that courts, lawyers, and the media play, there remains a disturbing pattern of attempts to hold「trials by newspaper.」 Regardless of the excess and sensationalism that sometimes characterize media coverage of criminal trials, the fundamental importance of free expression in a democracy is beyond question. The conflict between the free speech of the media and the interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system has been a particularly dramatic example of this struggle. Fair trial guarantee of an impartial jury, and the due process clause all require that criminal defendants be tried fairly before a jury that is not prejudiced against them. These fair trial guarantees are often seen as inevitably colliding with the rights of the media to gather and disseminate news about the criminal justice system, particularly in high-profile cases. While no constitutional hierarchy dictates that the free speech precedence over the fair trial, the elasticity of the fair trial concept and the vast arsenal of nonspeech-related means of limiting biasing influences demand the conclusion that prejudice to a fair trial is the exception and not the rule. There are no doubt many countries of free speech law in which balancing tests are appropriate. However, that speech about and access to the criminal justice system are not among them. Rules are inevitably both inflexible and imperfect in a number of ways. But the argument here is that when the interest to be protected is sufficiently valuable, rules have their place in constitutional jurisprudence. Unquestionably, there is some merit to this argument. Considering the concrete alternatives available, however, the suggestion here is that imperfect rules might well perform better than the current standard-based doctrines.
