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    Title: 財團法人國際合作發展基金會代理問題之研究
    Other Titles: A study on the operation of international cooperation and development fund : the perspectives of agency theory
    Authors: 謝惠月;Hsieh, Hui-yueh
    Contributors: 淡江大學公共行政學系公共政策碩士在職專班
    劉淑惠;Liu, Shu-hui
    Keywords: 公設財團法人;國際合作;代理理論;國合會;government-funded non-profit organizations;international cooperation;Agency Theory;Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan ICDF)
    Date: 2009
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 04:43:28 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 公設財團法人資金多由政府挹注,董、監事成員多由官派,具有高度的政府色彩,並扮演政策實踐者的角色,完成特定的政策目標,但因政府機關與公設財團法人之間存在的代理問題,容易產生許多流弊,因此如何以有限人力、資源來進行有效的監督與管理,確值深入探究。
    為了突破外交困境,配合國家外交政策,整合援外資源,成立國合會作為我國從事國際合作發展工作的機構。本研究以代理理論為研究之基礎,配合深度訪談方式進行,試圖以代理理論說明外交部與國合會之代理關係所產生之目標不一致、資訊不對稱、績效不確定性等代理問題,進而利用激勵方式或監督之機制,以達到有效解決代理問題。因此本研究目的:
    一、根據代理理論、訪談意見分析及研究發現,就公設財團法人之監督及管理,提出契約應如何規劃、執行及改善之建議。
    二、外交部如何透過治理機制或控制的形式解決與國合會雙方所產生的代理問題,亦即如何使外交部與國合會的利益一致,彼此能共同追求組織效能最大化為目標。
    三、藉以了解國合會之運作狀況及實際委託執行情形,期能對於國合會的管理與監督,提供適切之看法,並能在相關法令的釐訂及執行上發現具體可行之改進方案。
    經由本研究所進行之深度訪談,綜合研究結論,提出下列建議:重新界定雙方的地位角色、加強專業訓練與管理、提升組織自主性、健全董∕監事會的功能、慎選董事並明訂資格條件、以監督與誘因等方式達成目標一致。
    Board directors and independent supervisors of government-funded non-profit organizations are usually appointed by the government as well, thus they often bring their own politics into the organizations, play the role of executors of government policy, and have as their aim the completion of certain policy goals. However, agency representation between government institutions and government-funded non-profit organizations mean there is space for improper practices to take root. Thus research into effective oversight and management under resource and manpower constraints is important and worthy.
    The Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (Taiwan ICDF) was established as an institution oriented towards international cooperation and development, to help Taiwan promote foreign relations and integrate Taiwanese foreign assistance resources in coordination with national foreign policy. This research, basing itself on the agency theory, uses in-depth interviews in order to illuminate the problems between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Taiwan ICDF arising from the agency representation mechanism, namely: a lack of common goals, information asymmetry, and uncertain results. This paper further suggest improvements and solutions through rewards or monitoring mechanisms. Thus our research aims are as follows:
    1.Based on the agency theory, analysis of interviews, and research discoveries, recommend measures to improve the supervision and management of government-funded non-profit organizations, and make further suggestions on how contracts should be drawn, executed, and improved upon.
    2.Elaborate on how MoFA could solve the agency problem between it and Taiwan ICDF through better management and control, thus achieving a commonality of goals between MoFA and Taiwan ICDF, and allowing for a maximization of institutional efficiency for both institutions.
    3.Through a better understanding of the operations of Taiwan ICDF and the status of its commissions, to provide appropriate commentary on the management and supervision of Taiwan ICDF, and discover further improvements in related legislation or the execution of established laws.
    Through our in-depth interviews and research conclusions, this paper provide recommendations as follows: redefine the roles and redraw the boundaries of both institutions, improve professional training and management, increase organizational autonomy, fully utilize the board of directors and independent supervisors, carefully select board directors and provide clear selection criteria, and achieve commonality of goals through adequate supervision and appropriate rewards.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute & Department of Public Administration] Thesis

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