基於路網績效是由個體用路者與其它用路者集體互動之決策，本研究認為因應交通資訊影響下，用路者作路徑決策時還會考慮其他用路者因應資訊提供之反應，以選擇因應路徑策略達成對個人有利結果(報酬)，此即賽局形式。因此，本研究應用賽局理論以實驗方式觀察用路者間的互動行為，將管理策略視為外在因子，透過賽局實驗之反應進行資料蒐集，以進行分析在交通資訊影響下用路者與其它用路者間之雙玩家的非合作賽局(直接性賽局explicit game))，並進一步構建個人路徑行為模式與校估(置入性賽局 placement)。 本研究之工作內容歸納為三部份：(1)用路者行為特性與賽局傾向之前置分析，利用問卷調查獲得用路者路徑選擇行為所欲達成的目標、對於資訊的認知與使用情形、路徑使用的認知與態度之自評情形基本特性，以及利用群集分析獲得路徑行為傾向與用路者間的賽局行為傾向，後兩者並可作為後續置入性賽局模式校估。(2)動態控制賽局模擬實驗，主要目的在於觀測與分析個體用路者在不同賽局提示元素資訊形式提供下用路者間互動的波動狀態，蒐集用路者逐日動態行為決策資料。(3)分析整體與個人賽局動態決策行為之變化狀態，並經由實驗所取得資料構建置入性賽局，即以無異帶為基礎並加入賽局屬性所構建的動態路徑變換行為模式，分析個別用路者的決策反應。 本研究係以台北某地區之擬真路網進行10週50日之逐日動態賽局實驗，並以無異帶區間之概念來構建個人的逐日動態行為模式。研究結果顯示，以實驗的方式可反應個體用路者與整體路網出象的波動變化與漸趨於穩定現象，並可從賽局分群傾向分析賽局實驗結果，了解不同賽局傾向的個體用路者會有不同的賽局決策行為。另外，從直接性賽局(explicit game)可分析總計整體用路者互動之最終結果發現會達到理論上之奈許均衡(Nash equilibrium)狀態；對於模式而言，透過無異帶可成功的構建用路者的賽局行為，並可用於解釋影響用路者逐日的動態賽局決策行為反應。因此，未來可作為資訊給予時之參考。 The dynamic route choice behavior is of the most interest to study the individual driver’s route choices under the influence of the route guidance information where individual driver makes consecutive route switch decisions along the traveling route. This particular issue has been successfully modeled with various forms and extensions under the notion of the “Indifference Bands” applied with Probit model specifications in recent years. However, this particular issue may be further investigated as game-like decisions of two perspectives: the game between road users (among whom makes individual route choice in response to traffic information) as an entity versus traffic management authority (who would distribute traffic and route guidance information to achieve its goal); and the game among road users (individual decision versus predicted others’ actions in response to traffic information). A concept of controlled experiment was implemented to investigate dynamic route choice game among users supplied with various degrees of explicit traffic and route guidance information. The experiment context includes two decision dimensions: day-to-day pre-trip route choice and en-route decisions with a period of ten consecutive working weeks (50 days) under various designated scenarios (sequences). As such, a three stage comprehensive controlled experiment has been conducted where selected subjects were selected to participate in a series of laboratory simulation as commuting drivers while the researcher regard traffic management as authority. The tasks of this study are in two folds: the first to examine the explicit game where evolution of the individual’s (player’s) consecutive decision and playoffs will be recorded and analyzed, including the decision to decision dynamics and their final (convergence) state. The second task is to further modeling the road user’s dynamic decision with embedded game concept in the notion of jointed indifference bands specified as a Probit model structure such that the game elements will be treated as inclusive attributes. Three major findings may be concluded for this thesis research. The first, the game among users’ routing decisions indeed existed for taking into account of others’ actions in response to traffic information. The second, the proposed controlled game experiment delineated general phenomenon of cyclic fluctuation and stabilization within a week in the context of day-to-day commuting. Finally, two indifference band models (for unknown management strategy and known management strategy) were successfully specified and calibrated with good associated statistical criteria.