航空公司策略聯盟與高速鐵路競爭賽局之研究

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Title:	航空公司策略聯盟與高速鐵路競爭賽局之研究
Other Titles:	Modeling airlines alliances in competiting with high speed railway
Authors:	洪孟甫;Hung, Meng-fu
Contributors:	淡江大學運輸管理學系碩士班石豐宇;Shyr, Feng-yeu
Keywords:	航空聯營;運具競爭;賽局理論;均衡費率;Airlines Alliances;Transportation competition;Game theory;Equilibrium fares
Date:	2006
Issue Date:	2010-01-11 04:33:22 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	高速鐵路預計於民國95年底加入運輸市場，勢必會對西部運輸走廊之大眾運輸系統航空、台鐵及國道客運產生不小衝擊，尤其以長程路線之航空最為顯著，而在高速鐵路以高服務品質與較航空票價低的策略下，各航空營運業者如何訂定因應策略以增加市場競爭力，來獲取最大報酬為一重要課題。對於各運具而言，旅客偏好選擇大致與其所訂定之費率、提供之班次、旅行時間等因素有關。而航空公司在因應高速鐵路通車其採取聯營之方式與可行性，為我們探討重點，因此本研究首先回顧個體選擇模式、賽局理論之基本假設與航空公司聯營之文獻，並且探討各運具之間競爭與航空公司間在透過各種聯營型式下，其報酬函數之構建與票價競爭之均衡求解。報酬函數是由三個部分所構建而成：需求模式、市場佔有率模式與成本模式，而本研究採取Bertrand模式來求取各運具均衡費率與航空班次，並且利用Stackelberg模式來探討各運具領導跟隨的營收情形，在路線選擇方面則以台北-高雄與台北-台南兩路線做為實證分析。求解結果發現在Bertrand模式下，各運具均衡費率在高速鐵路通車後會略減，而航空於高速鐵路通車後全聯營班次則以19班為最佳，並且航空全聯營將比獨營或少數聯營較好。而在Stackelberg模式下，領導者高速鐵路營收會較Bertrand模式時來的高，但其他運具則是以Bertrand模式較好，而在總體運輸市場營收方面以Bertrand模式較高。在社會福利分析方面，各運具Bertrand模式在高速鐵路通車後總社會福利皆較高速鐵路通車前高，且與Stackelberg模式比較上社會福利相對為佳。 After the high speed railway join the transport market at the end of 2006, and certainly , the public transport (airway, railway, freeway buses) of the western transportation corridor will be hit hard by it, especially the long route of airway. The high speed railway with high service quality and lower price. How to make tactics to increase the market competitiveness and gain the largest profit is an important subject for airway. With transportations, the factors for the choice in favor of passengers is about fares, schedule, travel time. Because of the high speed railway join the transport market, The Airlines Alliances and it’s feasibility are the points we’re discussing about. So this research reviews the way of choosing of individuals, game theory , and the documents of the Airlines Alliances at first. We probe the competition of each transport and the various kinds of Airlines Alliances with modeling the profit functions and solving equilibrium fares under market equilibrium. There are three major components of the payoff function：the demand model, the market share model, and the cost model. We use Bertrand model to solve equilibrium fares and frequency. And we use Stackelberg model to study each transport and have income which follows and leader to accept the situation. A case study of using survey data collected from passengers flying from Taipei to Tainan and from Taipei to Kaohsiung is presented to verify the effectiveness of the model. The result of solving to find that transport under Bertrand model that having equilibrium rate will be slightly reduced after the high-speed railway is join to the traffic. It is best with class 19 that Airlines Alliances after the high-speed railway is join to the traffic., and Airlines Alliances is better than alone or the minority Alliances. Under Stackelberg model, high speed railway’s income is better than Bertrand model, but accept the respect by way of Bertrand relatively tally in the overall income of transportation market. Analyse the respect in the social welfare, it is high before each transporting and having Bertrand model the total social welfare after the high speed railway is join to the traffic, and it is good to relatively have the social welfare with Stackelberg model relatively.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Transportation Management] Thesis

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