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    Title: 董事會品質與盈餘管理之關聯性研究
    Other Titles: A study on the relationship between board quality and earnings management
    Authors: 陳明義;Chen, Ming-yi
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士在職專班
    黃振豊;Huang, Cheng-li
    Keywords: 公司治理;董事會品質(多元、專業及獨立性);盈餘管理;裁決性應計數;corporate governance;Board Quality(Diversity、Professionlism、Independence);Earnings Management;Discretionary Accruals
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 04:28:35 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 有鑑於近年來國內外企業弊案頻傳,各國主管機關無不積極尋找防弊之道,然美國於2002年所頒布的沙賓法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)中,已針對加強公司治理列為該法案的重要項目之一,因此,在尚未找到有效解決企業弊案發生的方法前,公司治理仍是一帖有效的良方。由於董事會是公司治理的核心機制,故本研究探討董事會品質的形成,進而瞭解對盈餘管理的影響程度。而董事會品質係以董事會之多元性、專業性及獨立性三大層面所構成;盈餘管理則是以裁決性應計數絕對值為替代之衡量變數,藉此建立衡量關係之模型。此外,因台灣上市公司中,集團企業與電子產業之環境特殊,故另外考量以集團及產業別的情境下,探討董事會品質與盈餘管理之關係是否有所差異。
    實證結果發現(1)董事會多元性品質構面:機構法人董事比及董事會規模對盈餘管理變數呈顯著正及負相關,實證認為,機構法人董事比愈小董事會多元性品質較佳,盈餘管理程度也較小(電子及非電子業亦同);而董事會規模愈大董事會多元性品質較佳,盈餘管理程度亦較小(集團、電子及非電子業亦同)。而在非電子業及集團企業情境下,公司若有設置審計或其他功能性委員會時,盈餘管理程度亦有抑制效果。因此,實證認為,非電子產業及集團企業中,有設置審計或其他功能性委員會時,董事會多元性品質較佳,盈餘管理的程度則愈趨緩和。(2)董事會專業性品質構面:在非電子業情境下,具有碩士以上程度的董事愈多,董事會專業性品質愈佳,而盈餘管理程度亦較緩和;另外,在集團企業情境下,公司若為董事投保責任險,則專業性品質較差,而有助於盈餘管理行為的加劇。(3)董事會獨立性品質構面:董事長兼任總經理與盈餘管理變數呈顯著正相關;而董事股權質押比與獨立董事兼任其他公司董事職務多寡對盈餘管理變數呈顯著負相關。實證認為,董事長兼任總經理時董事會獨立性品質較差,盈餘管理程度較大(集團、非集團企業及電子業亦同);董事股權質押比愈高董事會獨立性品質較好,盈餘管理程度較小(集團企業及電子業亦同);獨立董事兼任其他公司董事職務愈多董事會獨立性品質較好,盈餘管理程度較小(非電子業亦同)。最後,我發現在非電子產業的情境下,獨立董事席次愈高有助於緩和盈餘管理現象,但在集團企業的情境下卻有助長盈餘管理的行為。
    Enterprise frauds of both domestic and international origins are reported in the media with increasing frequency, and the governing agencies of all countries also responded with aggressively seeking preventive measures for such abnormalities. In the US, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 refocused on one of its important items, the corporate governance as part of the endeavors. Thus, this becomes clear until an effective cure for preventing enterprise fraud is found; corporate governance remains to be one of the better solutions to fraud problems. Since board of directors is the core mechanism of corporate governance, this study intends to explore the quality formation for the board, in addition to further comprehend influences onto the extent of corporation earnings management. The quality of board is comprised of three layered-profiles separated as diversity, professionalism and independence. And the earnings management employs absolute value of discretionary accruals as its replacement measuring variables, in order to establish the model of measuring relationships. Furthermore, due to special circumstances surrounded conglomerate enterprises and electronic industry of the listing companies in Taiwan, this study also takes into account conglomerate and industry factors, to explore whether there are any discrepancy of relationship between the board quality and earnings management.
    The findings of this study are (1) The diversified board quality composition: earnings management variables correlates with the ratios of institution board member in a positive way, but in a negative aspect with the board’s size and magnitude. Thus, this findings conclude that the lesser the institution member ratio, the better the diversified board quality becomes with lesser extent of earnings management. ( This applies to both electronic and non-electronic industries). Although the bigger the board sizes and magnitudes, the better the diversified board qualities become, with lesser extent of earnings management. (This applies to conglomerate enterprises, electronic and non- electronic industries). Nevertheless, corporations under the non-electronic industry and conglomerate environment, those with setup of board mechanism with auditing or other functionalities, would have a restraining effect onto the extent of earnings management. Consequently, the findings conclude that, within the conglomerate enterprise and non-electronics industry, those with the setup of board mechanism with auditing or other functionalities, the diversified board quality would perform better, and the extent of earnings management would be somewhat mitigated. (2)The professional quality composition of the board: Under the circumstances of non-electronic industry, the more the number of board member with academic degrees of Master and up, the milder the extent of earnings management becomes. Moreover, under the circumstance of conglomerate enterprise, if the corporation purchases liability insurance policies for its board member, this would result with poor quality in professionalism, and encourage the extensive behaviors of earnings management. (3)The quality composition of board independence: there is a positive correlation to earnings management variables if the chairman of the board holds a concurrent post of the president for that corporation. On the contrary, there is a negative correlation between earnings management variables with ratios of pledge of stock rights, in addition to independent director holding more or less concurrent post(s) of other corporation directors. The findings conclude that, with the chairman of the board holding concurrent position of the president, the quality of board independence suffers with greater extent of earnings management. (This applies to electronic industries, conglomerate and non-conglomerate enterprises). The higher the ratio of pledge of stock rights, the better the quality of board independence becomes, with lesser extent of earnings management. (This applies to both conglomerate enterprises and electronic industries). The more the independent board member holding concurrent post of other corporations, the better the quality of board independence becomes, with lesser extent of earnings management. (This applies to non-electronic industries). Lastly, I found out that under the non-electronic industry environment, greater number of independent director would mitigate the phenomenon of earnings management. On the contrary, the former would encourage the behavior of earnings management under the circumstances of conglomerate enterprise.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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