本研究以美國前三千大企業為研究對象，探討企業面對正盈餘、去年同期盈餘、分析師盈餘預測等三類盈餘門檻下，經理人是否有操控盈餘的行為。結果顯示當管理前盈餘高（低）於門檻時，經理人確有使用裁決性應計項目降低（增加）盈餘的行為，且隨管理前盈餘與門檻間差距程度之增加，使用程度也愈加提升。業外損益方面，僅發現當管理前盈餘低於門檻時，企業有認列處分利得以增加盈餘數字的情形，且使用程度亦隨距離門檻之差距增加而擴大。最後，本研究亦對裁決性應計項目與業外損益間的內生關係進行驗證，結果部份支持了管理前盈餘與門檻間差距大（小）時，兩盈餘管理工具間的使用為互補（替代）關係。 In a sample of firms listed in Russell 3000, we investigate the behavior of earnings management by discretionary accruals (DA) and non-operating assets (NOA) around earnings thresholds, including positive earnings, earnings of the same quarter in last year, and analysts’earnings forecast. Results indicate that managers tend to use DA to decrease (increase) earnings when pre-managed earnings are above (below) earnings thresholds. The bigger the difference between pre-managed earnings and threshold, the stronger the use of DA is. Results also reveal that managers realize gains by disposing NOA to increase earnings when pre-managed earnings are lower than thresholds. Again, the positive association between threshold difference and use of NOA holds in this case. Testing the endogenous relation between DA and NOA, we find, at least in part, a complementary (substitute) relationship between these two instruments when thresholds difference is big (small).
