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    Title: 公司治理機制、獨立性疑慮與會計師公費之關聯性
    Other Titles: The influence of audit fees for independence doubt and corporate governance
    Authors: 黃麗津;Huang, Li-jin
    Contributors: 淡江大學會計學系碩士班
    張寶光;Chang, Bao-guang
    Keywords: 獨立性疑慮;公司治理;審計公費;非審計公費;independence doubt;corporate governance;audit fees;non-audit fees
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2010-01-11 04:26:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文首先探討會計師獨立性疑慮是否對總公費結構中之審計公費與非審計公費產生影響。以台灣2002年至2005年符合會計師公費揭露要求之公司資料,在控制公司規模對估計結果之影響後發現,隨著獨立性疑慮程度的高低,會計師向受查客戶收取總公費中的審計及非審計公費之結構有顯著差異,即低獨立性疑慮組別之審計公費比重顯著較非審計公費為高,相反地,高獨立性疑慮組別之審計公費比重顯著較非審計公費為低。實證結果不但支持本文對審計公費與非審計公費呈負相關之預期,亦支持管制機構門檻揭露要求之適當性,且在比對較極端個案年報的質化資訊後發現,這些非審計公費比例愈高的個案,即會計師的獨立性疑慮愈高者,其在財務報表中所揭露之非審計公費的內容愈模糊。
    再者,以董事會結構衡量公司治理內部機制,探討其會計師公費之關係。由於會計師所提供給公司之服務,包含查核與管理諮詢等服務,預期兩種會計師所專有之服務間存有有操弄、管理之疑慮。為此由公司治理角度出發,瞭解公司與會計師間所存在之管理行為。實證結果顯示,當公司治理內部機制愈差時,會計師所需承擔的風險愈大,以致所須投入之查核人力、時間愈多,故會對受查公司收取較高之審計公費;反之,則收取較低之審計公費。且因為公費管理之情況的影響,使得公司治理內部機制愈好時,非審計公費會愈大,反之則愈小。第三,由於將會計師獨立性可視為公司治理外部機制的一環,因此,探討公司治理內部外部機制兩者對會計師公費之影響。實證發現,公司治理機制會顯著影響公司與會計師間之獨立性對審計公費之關係,詳言之,當公司治理機制愈差,且公司與會計師間愈具獨立性時,會計師所收取之公費才會愈高。
    This text probe into accountant independence doubt in total audit fees structure audit fees and non-audit fees to exert an influence at first .Israel 2002 to 2005 Taiwan accord with accountant to be at public expense to reveal company materials of demand, control company scale find to influence, estimation of result, with independence level, doubt of degree, to check customer collect auditing in always audit fees and non-audit fees have difference of showing accountant, namely low independence auditing, doubt of group audit fees proportion apparent than non-audit fees to be high, on the contrary, high independence auditing, doubt of group audit fees proportion apparent than non-audit fees to be low.
    The real example result not only supports this text to be audit fees and non-audit fees and shoulders relevant expectancy, support controllerate threshold reveal it requires to be getting proper, and than find to quality message, case of annual report extremely also, these do not audit the case the higher in proportion non-audit fees, namely the higher one of independence doubt of the accountant, reveal among financial statement it non-audit fees expense content fuzzy.

    Moreover, join the Corporate Governance, probe into it and audit fees. Extant literature exhibits that the services auditors provide, including auditing and management consulting, may occur “fee management”. Form Corporate Governance, the administration behaviours existed among the company and accountant that understand. Our results show that for firms with poor corporate governance, auditors would pay more attention and bear higher auditing risk with the result of receiving higher auditing fees.
    On the other hand, prior studies indicate that when the relationship between corporations and auditors is more dependent, auditors might receive lower auditing fees. Further, this paper exhibits corporate governance mechanisms would significantly influence the relationship between auditor independence and auditing fees. In particular, for firms with poor corporate governance, auditing fees would be higher only when the relation between corporations and auditors is more independent.
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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